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GETTING A FULL BITE OF THE APPLE: WHEN 
SHOULD THE DOCTRINE OF ISSUE 
PRECLUSION MAKJ3 AN 
ADMINISTRATIVE OR ARBITRAL 
DETERMINATION BINDING IN 
A COURT OF LAW? 
JAY CARLISLE' 
INTRODUCTION 
W York courts have recently expanded' the scope of collateral es- 
toppel: also known as issue pre~lusion,~ by applying this doctrine to 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law: A.B.. University of 
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cated to Dean Robert B. Fleming and Dean Janet Johnson of Pace University. My col- 
leagues at Pace Law School, particularly Dr. Josephine Y. King, h o w  how much I 
appreciate their support and assistance. I also wish to thank Professor David Siegel for 
his help in the initial stages of this article, Professor Maurice Roscnberg for his thought- 
ful review of an earlier draft and Professor Oscar Chase for his criticism and 
encouragement. 
1. See Siegel, Expanding Applications of Collateral Estoppel (Issue Preclusion), 309 
N.Y. St. L. Dig. 1 (1985). 
2. Collateral estoppel is one of a number of doctrines collectively referred to as "res 
judicata." See 5 J. Weinstein, H. Korn & A. Miller, New York Civil Pnctice, 501 1.08. 
at 50-95 (1985) (citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments). The principle of collated 
estoppel precludes relitigation of factual issues decided by a court in a prior suit. It is to 
be distinguished from direct estoppel, which prohibits relitigation of issues actually liti- 
gated and determined in the first action when a second action is brought on the same 
claim. See F. James, Jr. & G. Hazard, Jr., Civil Procedure !j 11.16 (3d ed. 1985); D. 
Siegel, New York Practice !j 443 (1978). A narrower species of res judicata, collateral 
estoppel basically "precludes a party from relitigating in a subsequent action or proceed- 
ing an issue clearly raised in a prior action or proceeding and decided against that party 
or those in privity, whether or not the tribunals or causes of action are the same." Ryan 
v. New York Tel. Co., 62 N.Y.2d 494,500,467 N.E.2d 487,490,478 N.Y.S.2d 823,826 
(1984). Its typical application occurs when one of the parties to a civil action argues that 
preclusive effect should be given to one or more issues determined in an earlier civil 
action between the same parties in the same jurisdiction. Restatement (Second) of Judg- 
ments, Introduction at 1 (1982). 
The United States Supreme Court recently explained the difference between collatenl 
estoppel and res judicata in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore. 439 U.S. 322 (1979): 
Under the doctrine of res judicata, a judgment on the merits in a prior suit bars 
a second suit involving the same parties or their privies based on the same cause 
of action. Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, on the other hand, the sec- 
ond action is upon a different cause of action and the judgment in the prior suit 
precludes relitigation of issues actually litigated and necessary to the outcome of 
the first action. 
Id at 326 n.5 (quoting 1B J. Moore, J.D. Luus  & T.S. Currier. Fedenl Pnctice V- 
0.405[1], at 622-24 (2d ed. 1974)). Seegenerally Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 
153 (1979) (modern formulation of issue preclusion); Cromwell v. County of Sacramento, 
94 U.S. 351, 352-55 (1876) (setting forth fundamental historical differences between res 
judicata and collateral estoppel); 1B J. Moore, J.D. L u m  & T.S. Currier. Fedenl Pnc- 
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the results of administrative hearingsY4 arbitrations,' and third party liti- 
gations6. Traditionally, issue preclusion is applied when a question of 
fact or law resolved in a prior litigation is raised in a subsequent proceed- 
ing based on a different cause of action.' The judgment in the prior fo- 
tice, 5 0.405(1) (3d ed. 1984) (discussing issue preclusion in federal courts) [hereinafter 
1B Moore]; King, Collateral Estoppel and Motor Vehicle Accident Litigation in New York, 
36 Fordham L. Rev. 1, 11 & nn.72-79 (1967) (distinguishing issue preclusion from res 
judicata). Rosenberg, Collateral Estoppel in New York, 44 St. John's L. Rev. 165, 166 
(1969) ("[clollateral estoppel falls into the category of partial res judicata because its 
binding effect is limited to certain of the issues formerly in dispute, rather than extending 
to the entire controversy"). 
3. Modem approaches usually refer to both direct and collateral estoppel as "issue 
preclusion." See generally Restatement (Second) of Judgments, Ch. 3, introductory note 
at 131 (1982) (distinguishing direct and collateral estoppel). 
The New York State Court of Appeals has adopted this terminology. See American 
Ins. Co., 43 N.Y.2d 184, 189 n.2, 371 N.E.2d 798, 801 n.2, 401 N.Y.S.2d 36, 39 n.2 
(1977). But see Gramatan Home Investors Corp. v. Lopez, 46 N.Y.2d 481, 485, 386 
N.E.2d 1328, 1331, 414 N.Y.S.2d 308, 310-11 (1979) (court uses res judicata and collat- 
eral estoppel terminology). 
Consistent use of the terms "claim preclusion" and "issue preclusion" will help clarify 
the distinction between the two concepts in judicial opinions and will minimize the confu- 
sion created when "res judicata" is used to describe both of them. 
4. See Brugman v. City of New York, 64 N.Y.2d 101 1, 1012,478 N.E.2d 195, 196, 
489 N.Y.S.2d 54, 55 (1985) (administrative findings given preclusive effect, thereby 
preventing plaintiff from litigating issue of defendant's negligence in subsequent lawsuit); 
Ryan v. New York Tel. Co., 62 N.Y.2d 494, 502, 467 N.E.2d 487, 491, 478 N.Y.S.2d 
823, 828 (1984) (preclusive effect given to administrative findings made in an unemploy- 
ment insurance proceeding to estop plaintiff from maintaining a plenary damage suit for 
slander, false arrest, and wrongful discharge); Liss v. Trans Auto Sys., 109 A.D.2d 430, 
434-35, 492 N.Y.S.2d 394, 398 (1st Dep't 1985) (preclusive effect given to administrative 
findings), rev'd on other grounds, 68 N.Y.2d 15, 496 N.E.2d 851, 505 N.Y.S.2d 831 
(1986). Administrative determinations of New York State agencies also hr~ve been given 
preclusive effect in federal courts. See Zanghi v. Incorporated Village of Old Brookville, 
752 F.2d 42,46 (2d Cir. 1985). But see Hill v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 786 F.2d 550, 554 
(2d Cir. 1986) (court refused to give administrative determination preclusive effect be- 
cause defendant was not accorded full and fair opportunity to litigate claim). 
5. See Clemens v. Apple, 65 N.Y.2d 746, 749, 481 N.E.2d 560, 561, 492 N.Y.S.2d 
20, 21 (1985) (issue preclusion applied to arbitral determination to bar plaintiff from 
relitigating cause of injury); Fischer v. Broady, 118 A.D.2d 827, 828, 500 N.Y.S.2d 31 1, 
313 (2d Dep't 1986) (court grants preclusive effect to arbitral determination); Guarantee . 
Ins. Co. v. D'Alleva, 113 A.D.2d 941, 941-42, 493 N.Y.S.2d 632, 633 (2d Dep't 1985) 
(arbitral determination given preclusive effect in subsequent litigation); Hendershot v. 
Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 101 A.D.2d 649, 475 N.Y.S.2d 558 (3d Dep't 1984) (same). 
6. Kaufman v. Eli Lilly & Co., 65 N.Y.2d 449, 453, 482 N.E.2d 63, 65-66, 492 
N.Y.S.2d 584, 586-87 (1985) (issue preclusion applied to third-party litigation); Koch v. 
Consolidated Edison Co., 62 N.Y.2d 548, 554, 468 N.E.2d 1, 4, 479 N.Y.S.2d 163, 166 
(1984) (same), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1177 (1985); Schaeffer v. Eli Lilly & Co., 113 
A.D.2d 827, 829, 493 N.Y.S.2d 501, 502 (2d Dep't 1984) (same). But see Liss v. Trnns 
Auto Sys., 68 N.Y.2d 15, 22-23, 496 N.E.2d 851, 856, 505 N.Y.S.2d 831, 836 (1986) 
(court refused to give preclusive effect to determination of administrative proceeding 
when defendant in second action was not party to previous action). 
7. See Capital Tel. Co. v. Pattersonville Tel. CO., 56 N.Y.2d 1 1, 17, 436 N.E.2d 46 1, 
463, 451 N.Y.S.2d 11, 13 (1982) (collateral estoppel bars relitigation of issue determined 
in previous action); Gilberg v. Barbieri, 53 N.Y.2d 285, 291,423 N.E.2d 807, 808-09,441 
N.Y.S.2d 49, 50-51 (1981) (same); Shanley v. Callanan Indus., 54 N.Y.2d 52, 55, 429 
N.E.2d 104, 106, 444 N.Y.S.2d 585, 587 (1981) (collateral estoppel refers to the preclu- 
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rum precludes a redetermination of the issues necessary to the outcome 
of the first action.' Issue preclusion minimizes inconsistent determina- 
tions of factual issues among different  forum^,^ and promotes judicial 
economy.1° The doctrine is customarily considered in terms of funda- 
mental notions of justice and fairness." While some courts have used 
"res judicata" as a catch-all term12 for both claim precl~sion '~ and issue 
sive effect given to the determination of matters actually litigated in one action when 
those matters are raised in a subseqent action based upon a different claim.) See generally. 
5 J .  Weinstein, H. Korn & A. Miller, supra note 2, l q  5011.14, 501 1.24, & n. 223; Re- 
statement (Second) of Judgments $27  (1982); 0. Chase, Civil Litigation in Sew York, 
$ 21.03 (1983); Chase, Trends and Cross-Trends in Res Judicata, N.Y.L.J. May 25, 1982, 
at 1, col. 1. 
8. Traditionally, the application of issue preclusion required that an issue of fact, 
necessary and essential to the judgment, had been actually litigated and determined by a 
final judgment. See Commissioners of the State Ins. v. Low, 3 N.Y.2d 590, 595, 148 
N.E.2d 136, 138-39, 170 N.Y.S.2d 795,798 (1958). The Court of Appeals has expanded 
application of the doctrine to include matters that were necessarily decided in the prior 
action, though not actually litigated. See Schwartz v. Public Adm'r. 24 N.Y.2d 65. 71. 
246 N.E.2d 725, 729, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955, 960 (1969). 
9. See Schwartz v. Public Adm'r, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 74, 246 N.EZd 725, 730-31, 298 
N.Y.S.2d 955, 962 (1969) (issue preclusion reduces "the number of inconsistent results 
which are always a blemish on a judicial system."); Cummings v. Dresher, 18 N.Y.2d 
105, 107-08,218 N.E.2d 688,689,271 N.Y.S.2d 976,977 (1966) (" 'One who has had his 
day in court should not be permitted to litigate the question anew.' ") (quoting Israel v. 
Wood Dolson Co., 1 N.Y.2d 116, 119, 134 N.E.2d 97, 99, 151 N.Y.S.2d 1, 4 (1956)); 
New York State Lab. Rel. Bd. v. Holland Laundry, Inc., 294 N.Y. 480,493, 63 N.E2d 
68,74 (1945) (" 'The fundamental principle governing the general doctrine of [issue pre- 
clusion]' is 'that a party shall not be heard a second time on an issue which he has once 
been called upon and permitted to try and contest' ") (quoting Hendrick v. Biggar, 209 
N.Y. 440,444, 103 N.E. 763, 764 (1913)). Seegenerally, Restatement (Second) of Judg- 
ments $27  (1982) (discussing issue preclusion); D. Siegel. supra note 2, $5 443, 457 
(same); Hazard, Revisiting the Second Restatement of Judgments. Isue Preclnsion and 
Related Problems, 66 Cornell L. Rev. 564, 574-75 (1981) (same); Scott, Collateral Esrap 
pel by Judgment, 56 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1942) (same). 
10. See Kaufman v. Eli Lilly & Co., 65 N.Y.2d 449, 455, 482 N.E.2d 63, 67, 492 
N.Y.S.2d 584, 588 (1985); Gilberg v. Barbieri, 53 N.Y.2d 285, 291,423 N.E2d 807, 808, 
441 N.Y.S.2d 49, 50 (1981). See also University of Tenn. v. Elliot. 106 S. Ct. 3220. 3226 
(1986) (collateral estoppel serves both the parties' interest in avoiding the expenst: and 
trouble of repetitous litigation and the public's interest in conserving judicial resources). 
11. See Shanley v. Callanan Indus., 54 N.Y.2d 52,55,429 N.E.2d 104, 106,444 N.Y. 
S.2d 585, 587 (1981) (applying full and fair opportunity test); Gilberg v. Barbieri, 53 
N.Y.2d 285,291,423 N.E.2d 807,808,441 N.Y.S.2d 49,50 (1981) (issue preclusion must 
be analyzed in terms of fairness); People v. Plevy, 52 N.Y.2d. 58, 64-65, 417 N.EZd 518, 
522,436 N.Y.S.2d 224,228 (1980) (issue preclusion not to be mechanically applied and 
must occasionally yield to questions of fairness); S c h w ~  v. Public Adm'r. 24 N.Y.2d 
65,73,246 N.E.2d 725,730,298 N.Y.S.2d 955,962 (1969) ("No one would contend that 
the doctrine of collateral estoppel should be applied rigidly."). See generally 5 J. Wein- 
stein, H. Korn, & A. Miller, supra note 2 at 501 1.42; Currie, ,Uuttrality of Collateral 
Estoppel- Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 Stan. L. Rev. 281, 285-89 (1957); Herman, 
The New York Rulemaking Process: Rulemaking Procedures in New York. 47 Alb. L. 
Rev. 1051, 1075-80 (1983); Rosenberg, supra note 2 at 194. Commentators. however, are 
skeptical of whether the concern of the courts over due process and fairness is manifested 
when applying the doctrines of claim preclusion and issue preclusion. See Note, Preclu- 
sion of Absent Disputants to Compel Inten+enrion, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 1551 (1979); Note, 
Collateral Estoppel of Nonparties, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1485, 1496-1501 (1974). 
12. In its broadest sense, the term "res judicata" has been used to refer to a variety of 
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precl~sion'~,  the doctrines have different originsI5 and serve distinct 
functions. l6 
concepts dealing with the preclusive effects of a judgment on subsequent litigation. See 
James & Hazard, supra note 2 at 5 11.31; 1B Moore, supra note 2, n0.405(1); 5 J. Wein- 
stein, H. Korn & A. Miller, supra note 2, In 501 1.10-501 1.22; Cleary, Res Judicata Re- 
examined, 57 Yale L.J. 339 (1948); Degnan, Federalized Res Judicata, 85 Yale L.J. 741 
(1976); Holland, Modernizing Res Judicata: Refictions on the Parklane Doctrine, 55 Ind. 
L.J. 615 (1980); Vestal, Rationale of Preclusion, 9 St. Louis U.L.J. 29 (1964); Note, The 
Expansion of Res Judicata in New York, 48 Alb. L. Rev. 210,213-15 n.13 (1983) (author: 
Ann M. Williams) [hereinafter Res Judicata in N. Y.]; Note, Developments In T / J ~  Law 
Res Judicata, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 818 (1952) [hereinafter Developments]. 
13. Claim preclusion is the doctrine that "once a claim is brought to a final conclu- 
sion, all other claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions are 
barred, even if based upon different theories or if seeking a different remedy." Gin- 
camazzo v. Moreno, 94 A.D.2d 369, 371, 464 N.Y.S.2d 485, 486 (1st Dep't 1983) (citing 
Reilly v. Reid, 45 N.Y.2d 24, 29-30, 379 N.E.2d 172, 175-76, 407 N.Y.S.2d 645, 648-49 
(1978)). But see City of New York v. Caristo Const. Co., 62 N.Y.2d 819, 820-21, 466 
N.E.2d 143, 144, 477 N.Y.S. 603, 603-04 (1984) (provision in judgment that dismissal 
was without prejudice saved it from claim preclusion under "transactional analysis" ap- 
proach); Res Judicata in New York, supra note 12, at 232 n.74; see also Santangelo v. 
YMCA 100 A.D.2d 581, 582,473 N.Y.S.2d 520, 521 (2d Dep't 1984) (transactional anal- 
ysis applied to unappealed order granting summary judgment); Cimino v. Cimino, 98 
A.D.2d 706, 706, 469 N.Y.S.2d 103, 104 (2d Dep't 1983) (transactional analysis applied 
to divorce proceeding); Pauk v. Board of Trustees, 119 Misc. 2d 663, 666,464 N.Y.S.2d 
953, 955 (Sup. Ct. 1983) (transactional analysis applied in breach of contract action), 
modifed, 11 1 A.D.2d 17, 488 N.Y.S.2d 685 (1st Dep't 1985), afl'd, 68 N.Y.2d 702, 497 
N.E.2d 675, 506 N.Y.S.2d 308 (1986); Shartrand v. Town of Glenville, 118 Misc. 2d 128, 
130, 460 N.Y.S.2d 220, 222 (Sup. Ct. 1983) (transactional analysis applied to action in- 
volving property damage). See generally 5 J. Weinstein, H. Korn & A. Miller, supra note 
2, 5011.10-5011.22 (discussing res judicata). 
14. For a discussion of issue preclusion, see supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text. 
15. Although the concepts of claim preclusion and issue preclusion appear in English 
common law, each doctrine has a different origin. Claim preclusion is a Roman law con- 
cept while issue preclusion originated in Germanic law. The notion that a judgment has 
an independent preclusive effect is characteristic of Roman law while early Germanic law 
permitted a subsequent action and new judgment. See Developments, supra note 12, at 
820-21 nn.1-6. See generally Millar, The Historical Relation of Estoppel by Record to Res 
Judicata, 35 U. Ill. L. Rev. 41, 41-42 (1940) (translating Seelman, Der Rechtsztrg irn 
alteren deutschen Rechf, 107 Gierkes Untersuchungen zur deutschen Staats - und Recht- 
sgeschichte 90, 103, 198-99 (191 1)). 
16. See Schuylkill Fuel Corp. v. Nieberg Realty Corp., 250 N.Y. 304, 306-07, 165 
N.E. 456, 457 (1929). Distinguishing claim preclusion from issue preclusion, Judge Car- 
dozo stated: 
A judgment in one action is conclusive in a later one not only as to any matters 
actually litigated therein, but also as to any that might have been so litigated, 
when the two causes of action have such a measure of identity that a different 
judgment in the second would destroy or impair rights or interests established 
by the first. It is not conclusive, however, to the same extent when the two 
causes of action are different, not in form only, but in the rights and interests 
affected. The estoppel is limited in such circumstances to the point actually 
determined. 
Id., 165 N.E.2d at 457 (citations omitted). The first quoted sentence describes the doc- 
trine of claim preclusion. The next two sentences describe the doctrine of issue preclu- 
sion. See D. Siege], supra note 2, 5 457 at 605. 
The distinction between the doctrines was recognized by the United States Supreme 
Court as early as 1877. See Cromwell v. County of Sacramento., 94 U.S. 351, 352-53 
(1877). See generally Hazard, supra note 9, at 580-86 (distinguishing collateral estoppel 
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Recent New York cases have affirmed summary judgments on the ba- 
sis of issue preclusion, in effect allowing prior administrative and arbitral 
issue determination to bar litigation of claims in a judicial forum." The 
high volume of actions filed each year in New York courts18 may furnish 
some judges with an incentive to use issue preclusion as a means of con- 
trolling their calendars by prohibiting some parties from relitigating deci- 
sive issues determined against them in administrative and arbitral 
forums.lg In this sense, some judges may be inclined to conserve judicial 
resources and reduce burdensome caseloads by relaxing their demands 
on traditional requirements of fairness, as embodied in the "full and fair 
opportunity" test.20 
from claim preclusion); Vestal, Extent of Claim Preclusion, 54 Iowa L. Rev. 1, 3-4 (1968) 
(illustrating distinction between claim preclusion and issue preclusion); Vestal, Proce- 
dural Aspects of Res Judicata/Preclusion, 1 U .  Tol. L. Rev. 15, 28 (1969) (same); Res 
Judicata in A! Z, supra note 12, at 216-17 nn.17-22 (discussing Sclluylkill Fuel). 
17. See Clemens v. Apple, 65 N.Y.2d 746, 748-49, 481 N.E2d 560, 560-61, 492 
N.Y.S.2d 20, 20-21 (1985); Brugman v. City of New York, 64 N.Y.2d 101 1, 1012,478 
N.E.2d 195, 196,489 N.Y.S.2d 54, 55 (1985); Ryan v. New York Tel. Co., 62 N.Y.2d 
494, 502,467 N.E.2d 487,491,478 N.Y.S.2d 823, 827 (1984); see ako Green v. Ingber, 80 
A.D.2d 928,928,437 N.Y.S.2d 761,763 (3d Dep't 1981) (administrative bard's decision 
entitled to binding effect within state's courts so long as it was within board's power to 
make determination); Bernstein v. Birch Wathen School, 71 A.D.2d 129, 132, 421 
N.Y.S.2d 574, 575 (1st Dep't 1979), aff'd, 51 N.Y.2d 932, 434 N.Y.S.2d 994 (1980) (the 
principles of issue preclusion are applicable to the quasi-judicial determinations of admin- 
istrative agencies and are, if final, binding in a court of law); 0. Chase, CPLR M a n d  
5 25.04(e) (1985) (issue preclusion applicable to arbitral determinations). The application 
of issue preclusion to administrative and arb i td  determinations in subsequent court pro- 
ceedings is to be distinguished from the preclusive effect given by one administrative body 
to the prior decision of another administrative body. This application should also be 
distinguished from the preclusive effect of a judicial determination in a subsequent h i -  
tral proceeding. See Newsday, Inc. v. Ross, 80 A.D.2d 1, 5, 437 N.Y.S.2d 376, 379-80 
(2d Dep't 1981); Note, Res Judicata/Collareral Estoppel Effect of a Court Dererminarion 
in a Subsequent Arbitration, 45 Alb. L. Rev. 1029, 1048-56 (1981) (author: hfelissa Hope 
Biren); see also infra note 177 and accompanying text. 
18. Over 2.5 million actions are filed each year in New York courts. New York 
Times, Jan. 6, 1986, at B1, col. 3; Letter from Alyson M. Brenner, Office of the Director 
of Programs and Planning of the State of New York Unified Court System Office of 
Management Support (Office of Court Administration) to Professor Jay C. Carlisle, dated 
October 29, 1986 (computer breakdown of actions filed in New York State Courts) (avail- 
able in the files of Fordham Law Review). 
19. Courts have been using issue preclusion to support the granting of defendants' 
motions for summary judgment. See supra notes 11. 17 and accompanying text. See a h  
King, supra note 2, at 2 (application of issue preclusion "could result in minimizing de- 
lays and repetitious litigation"). 
20. The Court of Appeals first explicitly adopted the "full and fair opportunity" test 
in Schwartz v. Public Adm'r, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 71, 246 N.E.2d 725, 728, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955, 
959 (1969). 
In Schwartz a judgment was granted in favor of a passenger in an action against the 
operators of two colliding vehicles. See id. at 75-76.246 N.E2d at 731-32. 298 N.Y.S.2d 
at 963-64. In a second action the operator of the first vehicle sued the operator of the 
second vehicle and the latter was permitted to use a prior finding of negligence against 
both drivers in order to preclude the lawsuit. See id. at 74-75. 246 N.E2d at 731, 298 
N.Y.S.2d at 963. Under the law of contributory negligence in effect at the time, b t h  
drivers were barred from any recovery. See id. at 75-76, 246 N.EZd at 731-32. 298 
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Satisfaction of the full and fair opportunity test requires a comparison 
of the procedural opportunities available to the litigants in the initial and 
subsequent forums." Indeed, the New York State Court of Appeals has 
stated that issue preclusion cannot be invoked if dissimilar procedural 
opportunities could result in the same issue being determined differently 
in the second forum.22 Implicit in the Court of Appeals' decision to apply 
N.Y.S.2d at 963-64. The Court of Appeals noted that the doctrine of collateral estoppel 
should not be applied rigidly and stressed that each case should be decided on its facts. 
See id. at 73, 246 N.E.2d at 730, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 962. Nonetheless, the court observed 
that its recent decisions had recognized the need for a prompt and non-repetitious judicial 
system. See id. at 69, 246 N.E.2d at 727, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 958. The court went on to 
state: 
New York Law has now reached the point where there are but two necessary 
requirements for the invocation of the doctrine of [issue preclusion]. There 
must be an identity of issue which has necessarily been decided in the prior 
action and is decisive of the present action, and, second, there must have been a 
full and fair opportunity to contest the decision now said to be controlling. 
Id. at 71, 246 N.E.2d at 729, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 960. 
The court explained that common sense and the realities of the usual collision accident 
established identity of the issues, see id. at 74-75246 N.E.2d at 731,298 N.Y.S.2d at 962- 
63, but it did not set forth any guidelines to delineate which issue in the second action 
was, or was not, foreclosed by the prior judgment. By its failure to critically analyze this 
question, which had long been one of the most difficult problems in the application of 
issue preclusion, the court, in effect, implied that the "identity of issue" prerequisite 
should be of less importance than the "full and fair opportunity" requirement. While the 
court's approach might prevent much legal talent and energy from being dissipated in 
litigating the interminable procession of motor vehicle negligence cases, it also portended 
a greater emphasis on judicial economy. The shift in emphasis is underscored by the 
court's discussion of the public's concern about the great delays in accident litigation. 
See id. at 74, 246 N.E.2d at 731, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 962. Surely, the court was hinting that 
it would flexibly apply the identity of issue requirement, not only to prevent inconsistent 
judgments, but to reduce the heavy caseloads that were becoming increasingly burden- 
some to the judicial system. See id., 246 N.E.2d at 730, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 962. 
While acknowledging that each case must be decided on its own facts, the Court of 
Appeals enumerated several factors to be considered in determining whether a party has 
had a full and fair opportunity to be heard in the earlier action. Although not intending 
to formulate an exclusive list, the court suggested that the following factors be consid- 
ered: "the size of the claim, the forum of the prior litigation, the use of initiative, the 
extent of the litigation, the competence and experience of counsel, the availability of new 
evidence, indications of a compromise verdict, differences in the applicable law and fore- 
seeability of future litigations." Id. at 72, 246 N.E.2d at 729, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 961. For a 
discussion of other factors, see A. Vestal, Preclusion/Res Judicata Variables: Adjlrdicar- 
ing Bodies, 54 Geo. L.J. 857, 885-89 (1966); Restatement (Second) of Judgments $8 27-29 
(1982). 
21. See Koch v. Consolidated Edison Co., 62 N.Y.2d 548, 555 n.4,468 N.E.2d 1, 4-5 
n.4,479 N.Y.S.2d 163, 166-67 n.4 (1984) (citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments 29 
(1982)), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1177 (1985). 
22. See id. at 555 n.4, 468 N.E.2d at 4-5 n.4, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 166-67 (citing Restate- 
ment (Second) of Judgments § 29 (1982)). See also Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 
U.S. 322, 330-31 (1979) ("might be unfair to apply offensive estoppel [when] the second 
action affords the defendant procedural opportunities unavailable in the first action that 
could readily cause a different result") (footnote omitted). When administrative forums 
have substantially different procedural rules, the doctrine has not been applied. See Board 
of Educ. v. New York State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 106 A.D.2d 364, 365-66, 482 
N.Y.S.2d 495, 496-97 (2d Dep't 1984) (issue preclusion not granted to prior administm- 
tion because complainant's allegation that she had been subjected to a racial slur was only 
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this doctrine to administrative hearings and arbitral determinations, 
however, is the notion that the full and fair opportunity test can be satis- 
fied without these procedural safeguards. While the Restatement (Sec- 
ond) of Judgments supports granting preclusive effect to administrative 
determir~ations,~~ other commentators have questioned the applicability 
of issue preclusion to arbitral and administrative proceedings conducted 
without pre-trial discovery or strict adherence to rules of evidence.24 
briefly explored); see also Willer v. New York State Bd. of Regents, 101 A.D.M 937,938, 
475 N.Y.S.2d 656, 658 (3d Dep't 1984) (issue preclusion effect not given because prior 
administrative hearing did not give petitioner full and fair opportunity to litigate his 
claim). 
23. Restatement (Second) of Judgments. 5 83 (1982); see also University of Tenn. v. 
Elliot, 106 S. Ct. 3220, 3227 (1986) ("Federal courts must give the [state] agency's 
factfinding the same preclusive effect to which it would be entitled in state courts."). 
24. See D. Siegel, supra note 2, 5 456. Professor Siegel noted that "one hears criti- 
cism of the [Ryan] case. . . because many lawyers believe that an administrative pruceed- 
ing - at least one allowed impact in subsequent judicial proceedings - can't be said to be of 
the kind contemplated by the 'full and fair opportunity' requirement." Id. at 95 (Supp. 
1985). He further noted that since rules of evidence do not apply in administrative hear- 
ings and disclosure devices are unavailable. "rights jealously guarded in direct litigation 
can lose sanctity when asserted in the format of a collateral estoppel issue" Id. See 
Connolly & Moorehead, Res Judicata E@ of Rulings by State Administrative Agencies. 
N.Y.L.J., Sept. 5, 1985, at 1, col.1; Schwartz, Administrative Res Judicara, Vol. 193, 
N.Y.L.J., June 18, 1985, at 2, col. 2-3; Hoguet, Recent Appeals Court Cases ChongeScope 
of Collateral Estoppel, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 13, 1984 at 5, col. 1). 
In December 1985, the Committee on Labor and Unemployment Law of the Associa- 
tion of the Bar of the City of New York recommended legislation to limit the preclusive 
effect of decisions made by some Administrative Law Judges. The Committee on Labor 
and Employment Law of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York. Unemplo-b~ 
ment Insurance Decisions and the Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel, 40 The Record 738,748 
(1985) [hereinafter T l ~ e  Record. The Committee proposed that 
section 623 of New York State Labor Law be amended CIS follows: Renumber 
present Section 623 as subdivision (1) and add a new subdivision (2) to read, 
"Notwithstanding the above, no finding of fact or law contained in a decision of 
an Administrative Law Judge, the Appeal Board or a Court, obtained under 
this article, shall be deemed preclusive in any other action or praceeding, ex- 
cepting proceedings under this article." 
Id. at 748-49. 
The Committee's recommendation, which was based on a report criticizing the Court 
of Appeals decision in Ryan v. New York Tel. Co., 62 N.Y.2d 494,467 N.E2d 487,478 
N.Y.S.2d 823 (1984), concluded that preclusive effect should not be given to administra- 
tive findings made in unemployment insurance proceedings: 
It is the Committee's view (a) that unemployment insurance proceedings, 
designed for quickly determining the narrow issue of benefit eligibility, do not 
afford the kind of hearing and review that should warrant giving preclusive 
effect to the finding or determinations made; and @) that it would frustrate the 
purposes of the Unemployment Insurance Law to force adjudication of ques- 
tions relating to other potential civil litigation into that forum. The Committee 
also believes that deciding on an ad hor basis whether any particular unemploy- 
ment insurance determination might properly be given preclusive effect creates 
an undesirable lack of certainty about the possible future nmifications of the 
agency's actions. This uncertainty will inevitably cause parties to seek to re- 
solve collateral matters before the unemployment insurance referees (also called 
Administrative Law Judges or "ALJ's") or before the Unemployment Insur- 
ance Board. 
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In recent years, alternative means of dispute resolution have become 
important  resource^.^' Therefore, the question of when the determination 
of issues at administrative hearings and arbitrations should be granted 
preclusive effect in subsequent judicial litigations requires critical evalua- 
tion. Part I of this Article focuses on the general evolution of issue pre- 
clusion in New York. Part I1 discusses recent New York case law giving 
preclusive effect to administrative and arbitral issue determinations in 
subsequent state court proceedings. Part I11 analyzes the policy reasons 
for applying issue preclusion to administrative and arbitral issue determi- 
nations in such proceedings. Part IV concludes that the preclusive effect 
of these determinations in judicial forums should be limited by shifting 
the burden of satisfying the full and fair opportunity requirement to the 
party seeking to invoke the doctrine. 
I. ISSUE PRECLUSION IN NEW YORK: EVOLUTION OF THE 
CURRENT LAVJ 
A. Origins of Issue Preclusion in New York 
Originally, the common law doctrine of issue preclusion26 provided a 
narrow rule prohibiting a party from relitigating any issue clearly raised 
in a prior action and decided against that party.27 In New York it was 
used primarily in cases involving indemnity relationships or employment 
Id. at 738. 
25. See Breger, The A PA: An Administrative Conference Perspective, 72 Vn. L. Rev. 
337, 355 (1986) [hereinafter The APA]; Breger, Tfze Justice Conundrum, 28 Vill. L. Rev. 
923, 952-55 (1983); Green, Marks & Olson, Settling Large Case Litigatioti: An Alterria- 
five Approach, 11 Loy. L. Rev. 493, 501 (1978). 
Bernard H. Goldstein, one of the deans of the New York Bar, recently remarked: 
The congestion plaguing both federal and state courts has focused public atten- 
tion on the efficiency of our judicial system. Awareness of the existing burden 
on the judiciary, coupled with projections of increasingly frequent resort to liti- 
gation, has disturbed the public, distressed the legal profession, and threatened 
to diminish the quality of justice dispensed by our courts. 
Goldstein, Alternatives for Resolving Business Transaction Disputes, 58 St. John's L. Rev. 
69, 69 (1983) (footnotes omitted); see also Bell, Crisis in the Courts: Proposals for Cltat~ge, 
31 Vand. L. Rev. 3 , 4 5  (1978) (court system is severely pressured by increase in number 
of litigations); Burger, Isn't There a Better Way, 68 A.B.A. J. 274, 274 (1982) (acceptable 
results in civil litigation drained of value by delay, expense and emotional stress). 
26. In New York State the concept of res judicata is largely a common law doctrine. 
See Israel v. Wood Dolson Co., 1 N.Y.2d 116, 118, 134 N.E.2d 97, 98, 151 N.Y.S.2d 1, 3 
(1956). There are no statutes which specifically require its application. As a result of the 
requirement that a judgment be "on the merits" in order for the doctrine of res judicatn 
to be invoked, there are, however, statutes which affect the doctrine. See D. Siegel, supra 
at note 2, 9 442 at 586; see also N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. 9 5013 (McKinney 1963) (defin- 
ing when a dismissal is on the merits); N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. 5 3216 (a) (dismissal for 
want of prosecution not on merits); N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. 5 3217 @) (discontinuance 
by means of notice operates as judgment on merits). See generally 5 J. Weinstein, H. 
Korn & A. Miller, supra note 2 7 5013.01 (question of when dismissal is on the merits has 
impact on area of res judicata). 
27. See D. Siegel, supra note 2, $9 442-443. 
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and agency matters," and "was permitted in those cases only to avoid 
the absurd result of having the indemnitor exonerated, while the indem- 
nitee was held liable."29 
The traditional doctrine of issue preclusion applied to individual issues 
of law or fact rather than to whole claims or defenses.30 In the past, issue 
preclusion has been based more on the concern that it would be unfair to 
permit a party to relitigate an issue that had been fully litigated in a prior 
action and less on the notion of final it^.^' Thus, issue preclusion could be 
invoked even when the subsequent litigation involved a different cause of 
action, provided that the issue concerned questions of law or fact actually 
litigated and finally determined between the parties or their privies in the 
first case.32 Unlike claim preclusion, issue preclusion did not bar the 
presentation of matters that could have been determined in the first ac- 
tion but were not.33 
Initially, the question of whether to grant issue preclusion was ana- 
lyzed with regard to the relationship of the parties3" and the identity of 
the issue.35 The relationship of the parties was considered in terms of (1) 
privity of the parties, (2) their adversarial status, and (3) their mutuality 
with the New York courts were bound by the concept of "mu- 
tuality of e~toppel,"~' which prohibited a plaintiff who had not been a 
party to the first action from using issue preclusion offensively against the 
28. See Schwartz v. Public Adm'r, 24 N.Y.2d 65. 69. 246 N.E.2d 725. 728. 298 
N.Y.S.2d 955, 958 (1969). 
29. Id. at 69, 246 N.E.2d at 728, 298 N.Y.S.2d 958. 
30. See supra notes 7 ,  8, 16 and accompanying text. 
31. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
32. See Chase, supra note 7, 5 21.03, at 799 ("Issues of law are less subject to preclu- 
sion than those of fact"). The Restatement (Second) of Judgments states that decisions 
on issues of law should not be given preclusive effect, if "(a) the two actions involve 
claims that are substantially unrelated, or @) a new determination is warranted in order 
to take account of an intervening change in the applicable legal context or orhenvise to 
avoid inequitable administration of the laws" Restatement (Second) of Judgments 
5 28(2) (1982). It has been held in New York that "unmixed" issues of law are not 
subject to preclusion. See Department of Personnel v. City Civil Serv. Comm'n. 94 
A.D.2d 5, 7, 462 N.Y.S.2d 878, 879 (1st Dep't 1983) (quoting McGrath v. Gold, 36 
N.Y.2d 406, 411, 330 N.E.2d 35, 37, 369 N.Y.S.2d 62, 65 (1975)). 
33. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. However, the issue precluded need not 
actually have been litigated. It is enough that it was implicitly decided. See Reich v. 
Cochran, 151 N.Y. 122, 127-28, 45 N.E. 367, 368 (1896) (Court of Appeals held that 
" '[wlhatever is necessarily implied in the former decision is, for the purpose of the estop 
pel, deemed to have been actually decided.' ")(quoting Pray v. Hegeman, 98 N.Y. 351 
(1885)). 
34. See King, supra note 2, at 11-12 nn.80-87. 
35. See gerzerally Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 171-72 ("It would be irntiond and 
unjust to bind a party by a former finding on an issue, unless that very issue had becn 
adjudicated."). 
36. See King, supra note 2, at 1 1-12 nn.80-87. 
37. See 5 Weinstein, Korn & Miller, supra note 2, 4 501 1.38 ("Mutuality of estoppel 
L vm- referred to the prior rule, now discarded, that a party was not permitted to take -d 
tage of the result in a prior action unless he could meet the m e  standards of participa- 
tion or privity as a party who was bound by the judgment in that action."). 
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same defendant in a second action.38 
The identity of issue requirement provided that "[a] former adjudica- 
tion will be binding in a subsequent litigation . . . provided that the issue 
presented (a) is identical, (b) was actually litigated, (c) essential to the 
determination, and (d) was 'ultimate' or 'material' in the prior action and 
is also 'ultimate' or 'material' in the [latter] In cases where the 
disputed facts which arose from the subsequent action were identical to 
facts that had been actually litigated in an earlier action the test was 
satisfied by meeting the first two  requirement^.^' The third and fourth 
factors were considered only in more complicated cases.41 
B. The Modern Application of Issue Preclzrsion in New York 
After eliminating the mutuality of estoppel requirement two years ear- 
lier,42 the Court of Appeals introduced major revisions to the doctrine of 
38. Mutuality was based on the concern that unfair results might occur if issue pre- 
clusion was applied to persons not actually before the court in the first action. See D. 
Siegel, supra note 2, 9 460; Seavey, Res Judicata with Reference to Persons Neither Parties 
Nor Privies - Two California Cases, 57 Harv. L. Rev. 98, 99 (1943); Note, Res Jirdicata 
and the Automobile Accident, 8 Brooklyn L. Rev. 224, 225 (1938); see also B.R. DeWitt, 
Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 148, 225 N.E.2d 195, 199, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596, 602 (1967) 
(Breital, J., dissenting) (courts should be cautious when permitting offensive use of prior 
judgment by one not in privity to original suit). 
39. Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 171; see also Restatement Judgments 9 68(1) (1942) 
(issue of fact had to be actually litigated for application of collateral estoppel). 
40. 2 A. Freeman, Law of Judgments 9 691 (5th Ed. 1925). The "actually litigated" 
requirement was gradually modified. See Statter v. Statter, 2 N.Y.2d 668, 672, 143 
N.E.2d 10, 12, 163 N.Y.S.2d 13, 16 (1957) (first judgment of separation established valid- 
ity of marriage and therefore precluded a second action for annulment). The Court of 
Appeals held that issue preclusion bars the relitigation of any issue that was necessarily 
determined in a prior suit. See Schwartz v. Public Adm'r, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 7 1,246 N.E.2d 
725, 728, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955, 960 (1969) (in an automobile tort case where a plaintiff 
passenger established liability as against both his own driver and the other car's driver, a 
subsequent suit by the passenger's driver against the other driver was deemed precluded); 
Israel v. Wood Doisen Co., 1 N.Y.2d 116, 120, 134 N.E.2d 97, 99, 151 N.Y.S.2d 1, 5 
(1956) (in a commercial case a prior decision by one court that a contract had not been 
breached would preclude the same plaintiff from contending, in a second action, that a 
third party had induced the breach). 
41. See Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 182-85 (when identity between issues is not com- 
plete, courts consider whether such issues were ultimate or material and essential to the 
determination in both matters). New York courts traditionally distinguished between 
"ultimate facts" and "evidentiary facts" giving preclusive effect only to the former. See J. 
Weinstein, H .  Korn & A. Miller, supra note 2,n 501 1.29. The Court of Appeals qualified 
the distinction in Hinchey v. Sellers, 7 N.Y.2d 287, 293, 165 N.E.2d 156, 159, 197 
N.Y.S.2d 129, 133 (1959) (the court extended issue preclusion to the evidentiary findings 
of a New Hampshire court, notwithstanding its conclusion that the ultimate issue was 
different in New York.); see also Restatement (Second) of Judgments 5 27 comment 0) 
(1982) (even when a determination is necessary to judgment it may not be granted preclu- 
sive effect if it relates to an evidentiary fact rather than to an issue of law). 
42. Although the Court of Appeals recognized the proliferation of exceptions to the 
mutuality doctrine as early as 1937, see Good Health Dairy Products Corp. v. Emery, 
275 N.Y. 14, 17-18, 9 N.E.2d 758,759 (1937) Seegenerally 5 J. Weinstein, H. Korn & A. 
Miller, supra, note 2 5011.39, nn. 357-61 (derivative liability exception extended to 
situations where party to be bound by the prior judgment was the defendant in the first 
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issue preclusion in 1969.43 Both issues of law and fact may now be the 
action and the plaintiff in the second), it was not until 1967 that the court eliminated 
mutuality altogether. See B.R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 147,225 N.E.2d 195, 
198, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596, 601 (1967). In DeWitt, the court stressed the identity of issue 
requirement despite an absence of total identity of parties and concluded that the doctrine 
of mutuality was a "dead letter." Id., 225 N.E.2d at 198, 278 N.Y.S.2d at 601. 
Speaking through Judge Scileppi, the De Wirt court stated: "[I][ becomes increasingly 
obvious that this court looks to the issue involved in a prior judgment nther than to any 
hypertechnical rule of mutuality. . . ." Id. at 146,225 N.E.2d at 197.278 N.Y.S.2d at 600 
(citing Hinchey v. Sellers, 7 N.Y.2d 287, 165 N.E.2d 156, 197 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1959)). 
Thus, a truck owner, suing a jeep owner for property damage was permitted to invoke 
issue preclusion against the jeep owner because of the truck driver's prior successful ver- 
dict against the same jeep owner on a personal injury claim. Consequently, even though 
the truck owner was not a party to the first action, the court held that he derived his right 
to preclude the issue from the driver. See id at 148,225 N.E.2d at 199.278 N.Y.S.2d at 
601-02. The court was quick to point out that the truck driver and truck owner "do not 
technically stand in . . . privity," but held that their relationship was sufficient to invoke 
estoppel. See id. at 146, 148, 225 N.E.2d at 197, 199, 278 N.Y.S.2d at 600, 602. 
43. See Schwartz v. Public Adm'r, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 70, 246 N.E.2d 725, 728, 298 
N.Y.S.2d 955, 959 (1969). In Schware, the Court of Appeals recognized the nced for 
flexibility in the application of issue preclusion, see id. at 73, 246 N.E.2d at 730, 298 
N.Y.S.2d at 962 ("[nlo one would contend that the doctrine of collateral estoppel should 
be applied rigidly") and stressed that the decision to grant issue preclusion should be 
determined by the facts of the specific case. See id. at 70-72, 246 N.E.2d at 728-30. 298 
N.Y.S.2d at 959-961. Nonetheless, the court obsenred that its recent decisions had 
stressed the "need for a 'prompt and nonrepetitious judicial system'. " Id. at 69. 246 
N.E.2d at 727, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 958. 
The Schwartz court expanded the application of issue preclusion to include matters 
that were necessarily decided in the prior action, but not actually litigated, see id. at 71. 
246 N.E.2d at 729,298 N.Y.S.2d at 960. It affirmed the abandonment of the mutuality 
doctrine and substituted in its stead the full and fair opportunity requirement, stating: 
Flhere are but two necessary requirements for the invocation of the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel. There must be an identity of issue which has n e c b l y  
been decided in the prior action and is decisive of the present action, and. sec- 
ond, there must have been a full and fair opportunity to contest the decision 
now said to be controlling. 
Id. at 71,246 N.E.2d at 729, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 960. See also supra note 20 and accompa- 
nying text (discussing the full and fair opportunity requirement). 
Although the Schwarn court explained that the common sense and the realities of the 
usual collision accident established the identity of issues common to both actions, it failed 
to critically analyze this question, that had long been one of the most difficult problems in 
the application of issue preclusion. See Sclrlvarrz, 24 N.Y.2d at 74-75, 246 N.E.2d at 731. 
298 N.Y.S.2d at 963. The court in effect implied that the "identity of issue" prerequisite 
should be of less importance than the "full and fair opportunity" requirement. See id. at 
72-73, 246 N.E.2d at 729-30, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 961-62; supra note 20 and accompanying 
text. 
Finally, the court diminished the privity concept stating that it had. "alrwdy dis- 
carded, as irrelevant. . . the fact that there may or may not have been any significant junl  
relationship between the party seeking to invoke the doctrine and the prior victor." Id. at 
70, 246 N.E.2d at 728, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 958-59 (citations omitted). 
Today, "strict privity" (decedent-representative, trustee-beneficiary, guard~an-ward. 
committee-incompetent) is still used in connection with issue preclusion. See Ryan v. 
New York Tel. Co., 62 N.Y.2d 494, 500, 467 N.E.2d 487, 490, 478 N.Y.S.2d 823, 126 
(1984). Except for the use of "strict privity," the privity concept has little practical rele- 
vance or utility. See D. Siegel, supra note 2, 5 461. Professor Siegel points out that New 
York has abandoned the privity requirement when issue preclusion is used defensively in 
the second action, but that the doctrine "still hovers about, threatening if not belligerent. 
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bases for p r e c l ~ s i o n . ~ ~  The doctrine was made applicable to cases involv- 
ing tort claim~,4~ product liability matters,46 criminal convictions,4' med- 
ical malpra~tice,~' contract disputes,49 and bankruptcy  determination^,^^ 
as well as administrative  decision^,^' and arbitration awards.52 
As the doctrine now stands, a valids3 final judgments4 on the meritss5 
when offensive use is sought." Id. at 609. The diminishing of the privity doctrine has 
resulted in issue preclusion being utilized by persons who were not a party to the original 
action. See, e.g., Kaufman v. Eli Lilly & Co., 65 N.Y.2d 449,453,482 N.E.2d 63, 65,492 
N.Y.S.2d 584, 586 (1985) (third party permitted use of issue preclusion); Strauss v. Belle 
Realty Co., 65 N.Y.2d 399, 401, 482 N.E.2d 34, 35, 492 N.Y.S.2d 555 (1985) (same); 
Schultz v. Boy Scouts of Amer., 65 N.Y.2d 189, 192,480 N.E.2d 679,681,491 N.Y.S.2d 
90, 92 (1985) (same). Bur see Liss v. Trans Auto Sys., 68 N.Y.2d 15, 22-23, 496 N.E.2d 
851, 856, 505 N.Y.S.2d 831, 836 (1986) (Court of Appeals refuses to give preclusive effect 
to determination of administrative proceeding when defendant in second action was not 
party to previous action). 
44. "Issues of law are less subject to preclusion than those of fact." 0. Chase, supra 
note 7, 5 21.03, 799. "Unmixed" issues of law are not subject to preclusion. See Mc- 
Grath v. Gold, 36 N.Y.2d 406, 411, 330 N.E.2d 35, 38, 369 N.Y.S.2d 62, 65 (1975); see 
also Restatement (Second) Judgments 5 28, comment B (1982) ("the journey from a pure 
question of fact to a pure question of law is one of subtle gradations rather than one 
marked by a rigid divide"). 
45. See Koch v. Consolidated Edison Co., 62 N.Y.2d 548, 55243,468 N.E.2d 1, 3-4, 
479 N.Y.S.2d 163, 165-66 (1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1177 (1985); Malloy v. 
Trombey, 50 N.Y.2d 46, 51, 405 N.E.2d 213, 215, 427 N.Y.S.2d 969, 972 (1980). 
46. See Kaufman v. Eli Lilly & Co., 65 N.Y.2d 449, 453, 482 N.E.2d 63, 65, 492 
N.Y.S.2d 584, 586 (1985). 
47. See Merchants Mut. Ins. Co. v. Arzillo, 98 A.D.2d 495,496-97,472 N.Y.S.2d 97, 
98 (2d Dep't 1984). See also 5 J. Weinstein, H. Korn & A. Miller, supra note 2, at 1 
5011.23, nn.203-05; f i  501 1.26, n.241 (operation of issue preclusion in criminal cases dif- 
fers in some respects from civil matters). But see Davis v. Hanna, 97 A.D.2d 943, 944, 
468 N.Y.S.2d 729, 730 (4th Dep't 1983) (conviction after a guilty plea does not serve as a 
bar in subsequent civil litigation.) 
48. See Kret v. Brookdale Hosp. Medical Center, 93 A.D.2d 449, 449-50, 462 
N.Y.S.2d 896, 897 (2d Dep't 1983), aff'd, 61 N.Y.2d 861,462 N.E.2d 147,473 N.Y.S.2d 
970 (1984). 
49. See Gramatan Home Investors Corp. v. Lopez, 46 N.Y.2d 481, 483, 386 N.E.2d 
1328, 1330, 414 N.Y.S.2d 308, 310 (1979) (assuming privity requirements are met doc- 
trine of issue preclusion is applicable to contract claims). 
50. See Exchange Nat. Bank v. Femdge Properties, 112A.D.2d 33,34,490 N.Y.S.2d 
656, 657 (4th Dep't 1985). 
51. Brugman v. City of New York, 64 N.Y.2d 1011, 101 1,478 N.E.2d 195, 195,489 
N.Y.S.2d 54, 54, (1985); Ryan v. New York Tel. Co., 62 N.Y.2d 494, 499, 467 N.E.2d 
487, 489-90, 478 N.Y.S.2d 823, 825-26 (1984). See generally infra notes 80 - 106 and 
accompanying text (discussing the granting of preclusive effect to administrative determi- 
nations in judicial forums). 
52. Clemens v. Apple, 65 N.Y.2d 746, 747-48, 48 1 N.E.2d 560, 560-61,492 N.Y .S.2d 
20, 20-21 (1985). See generally infra notes 107-18 and accompanying text (discussing the 
granting of preclusive effect to determinations in judicial forums). 
53. See 0. Chase, supra note 17, 5 25.04[b] ("A judgment which is not valid can have 
no binding effect and its validity can be collaterally attacked.") 
54. See id. 3 25.04[a] ("The result in the first action will not generally have a binding 
effect on a subsequent action unless a final judgment has been reached in the first."). 
However, "[tlhe pendency of an appeal does not effect the judgment's use for [issue pre- 
clusion purposes]." 5 J. Weinstein, H. Korn & A. Miller, supra note 2, at fl 501 1.23b, 
n.220. 
55. See 0. Chase, supra note 17 5 25.04[c] ("The traditional rule is that a judgment 
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prevents parties or their priviess6 from relitigating issues of fact or law 
actually litigated or necessarily determined, in an earlier act i~n.~ '  In or- 
der to invoke issue preclusion the movant must establish the "identity of 
an issue" that was necessarily decided in the earlier proceeding with one 
that is decisive in the second action.5s The doctrine will be applied, how- 
ever, only if the opposing party fails to show that he was denied a full 
and fair opportunity to contest the issue in the first pro~eeding.~~ Thus, 
application of the doctrine hinges on showing the identity of the issues 
and satisfaction of the full and fair opportunity test. 
1. Identity of Issue 
In applying the identity of issue test, a court will review the record in 
the first action to determine if an issue actually litigated and necessary to 
a final judgment on the merits is the same as an issue decisive to the 
second action.@' Thus, if the legal theory in both actions is the same and 
there are no significant differences in the facts upon which both theories 
are based, identity of issue is generally sati~fied.~' This is true even when 
must be on the merits before full res judicata effect on be given to it."). Bur see Smith v. 
Russell Sage College, 54 N.Y.2d 185, 194 n.3,429 N.E.2d 746, 750 n.3 445 N.Y.S.2d 68, 
72 n.3 (1981) ("It is pertinent that the Restatement [of Judgments], 2d has completely 
abandoned the term 'on the merits.' "). See generally N.Y. Civ. Pnc. L. & R. 5 5013 
(McKimey 1963) (defining a "dismissal on the merits"). 
56. The general rule is that only persons who were parties to the original action can 
be bound by its result in a later proceeding. See Gramatan Home Investors Corp. v. 
Lopez, 46 N.Y.2d 481,486, 386 N.E.2d 1328, 1331,414 N.Y.S.2d 308, 311 (1979); 5 J. 
Weinstein, H. Korn & A. Miller, supra note 2, at gl 501 1.32-10.37. The rule is subject to 
exceptions when persons are in privity with a party to the original action. See 0. Chase, 
supra note 17, 3 25.04[fl. Similarly, "[a] person who controls the conduct of litigation in 
furtherance of his own self-interest will be bound, . . . . even though he is not a party of 
record or otherwise in privity with a party.'' Id. 
57. See Ryan v. New York Tel. Co., 62 N.Y.2d 494, 500,467 N.E2d 487, 490,478 
N.Y.S.2d 823, 826 (1984). 
58. See Koch v. Consolidated Edison Co., 62 N.Y.2d 548,554,468 N.E.2d 1.4.479 
N.Y.S.2d 163, 166 (1984), cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 1177 (1985); Ryan v. New York Tel. 
CO., 62 N.Y.2d 494, 500-01, 467 N.E.2d 487, 490, 478 N.Y.S.2d 823, 826 (1984). CJ 
Kaufman v. Eli Lilly & Co., 65 N.Y.2d 449,457-58,482 N.E.2d 63.68-69.492 N.Y.S.2d 
584, 589-90 (1985) (if issue is not litigated there is no identity of issue). 
59. See Ryan v. New York Tel. Co., 62 N.Y.2d 494,501,467 N.E2d 487,490-91.478 
N.Y.S.2d 823, 826-27 (1984) (party against whom estoppel is sought must be allowed to 
contend he was not afforded full and fair opportunity to litigate issue); Schwvanz v. Public 
Adm'r, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 71, 246 N.E.2d 725, 728, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955, 959 (1969) ("New 
York has adopted the full and fair opportunity test in applying the d~ctrine of collatenl 
estoppel."). 
60. See Kaufman v. Eli Lilly & Co., 65 N.Y.2d 449,455-56,482 N.E2d 63, 68,492 
N.Y.S.2d 584, 588 (1985); Schwartz v. Public Adm'r, 24 N.Y.7d 65, 71, 246 N.E.2d 725, 
728, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955, 960 (1969). See also 0. Chase, supra note 17, 25.03[b] 25-9 
(legal conclusion in two cases based on same facts should not differ). 
61. See 0. Chase, supra note 17, 25.03[b], at 25-8-10-9. Bur see Prresluha v. City of 
New York, 60 A.D.2d 226, 230, 400 N.Y.S.2d 818, 819-20 (1st Dep't 1977) (finding of 
negligence in prior litigation did not estop plaintiff from bringing subsequent malicious 
prosecution action arising from same facts); Vincent v. Thompson, 50 A.D.2d 21 1. 218. 
377 N.Y.S.2d 118, 125 (2d Dep't 1975) (in products liability action where plaintilfs 
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many parties assert the same claims in different actions arising from one 
transaction or occurrence against the same defendant.62 
Generally, the identity of issue requirement is not satisfied if the issue 
determination in the first action was merely an alternative ground for 
deciding the case.63 In at least one instance, however, the Court of Ap- 
peals has held that if an alternative issue determination was fully argued 
and carefully considered, it cannot be relitigated.64 
2. Full and Fair Opportunity Test 
Satisfaction of the "full and fair opportunity test" requires the exami- 
nation of a number of factors first set forth by the Court of Appeals in 
Schwartz v. Public Adrnini~trator.~~ These factors, which the Schwartz 
court described as modern and stable standards for invoking issue preclu- 
sion in New York, include "the size of the claim, the forum of the prior 
litigation, . . . the extent of the litigation, the competence and experience 
of counsel, the availability of new evidence, indications of a compromise 
verdict, differences in the applicable law and foreseeability of future 
l i t igat i~n."~~ 
sought to preclude the issue of whether the drug was defective, Appellate Division re- 
fused to apply the doctrine since the ultimate issue as to causal relationship between the 
defect and the injuries was not identical in the two actions). 
62. See Koch v. Consolidated Edison Co., 62 N.Y.2d 548, 557,468 N.E.2d 1, 56,479 
N.Y.S.2d 163, 167-68 (1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1177 (1985). 
63. See O'Conner v. G & R Packing Co., 53 N.Y.2d 278, 282-83, 423 N.E.2d 397, 
398-99,440 N.Y.S.2d 920,921-22 (1981) (alternative ground for deciding first action may 
be relitigated because the judge did not consider the effect of his holding on the second 
action); Restatement (Second) of Judgments 5 27 comment (i) (1982) (alternative 
grounds should not be granted preclusive effect); 5 J. Weinstein, H. Korn & A. Miller, 
supra note 2, at 1 501 1.28 ("There exists concern that, a determination in the alternative 
may not have been as carefully or rigorously considered as it would have if it had been 
necessary to the result, and in that sense it has some of the characteristics of dicta.' ") 
(quoting Restatment (Second) of Judgments 5 27 comment (i) (1982)). 
64. Malloy v. Trombly, 50 N.Y.2d 46,49-50,405 N.E.2d 213,215,427 N.Y.S.2d 969, 
971 (1980) (divided Court of Appeals held that a plaintiff motorist's action against a 
defendant motorist was precluded because the plaintiff had been found to have been con- 
tributorily negligent in a prior action involving the same facts). Although the earlier 
issue determination was neither necessary nor essential to the Court of Claims' decision, 
the Court of Appeals held that, since the determination was neither "causal [nor] of any 
lesser quality than [it would have been] had the outcome of the trial depended solely on 
this issue," the same issue could not be relitigated. Id. at 52, 405 N.E.2d at 216, 427 
N.Y.S.2d at 973 (footnote omitted). 
In a vigorous dissent, Judge Meyer criticized the majority for invoking issue preclusion 
merely to conserve judicial resources. Judge Meyer noted that, "[iln my view our recent 
decisions have accelerated [the] expansion [of issue preclusion] until the means threatens 
to become the end, to the detriment of litigants foreclosed by it, and without rensonnble 
relation to the policy factors giving rise to the doctrine in the first instance." Id. at 58, 
405 N.E.2d at 220, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 976. 
65. 24 N.Y.2d 65, 72, 246 N.E.2d 725, 729, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955, 961 (1969). See silpru 
notes 20, 43 and accompanying text. 
66. Schwartz v. Public Adm'r, 24 N.Y.2d 65,72,246 N.E.2d 725,729,298 N.Y.S.2d 
955, 961 (1969). See supra notes 20, 43 and accompanying text. Applying the test, the 
court remarked that the plaintiffs in the second action were full participants in the earlier 
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The full and fair opportunity requirement extends beyond terms of 
traditional notions of due pr~cess.~'  Satisfaction of this test requires a 
comparison of the procedural opportunities available in both for~ms.~"  
The Court of Appeals has suggested that issue preclusion cannot be in- 
voked if a forum in the second action affords a party, against whom pre- 
clusion is invoked, new procedural opportunities that could result in 
inconsistent  determination^.^^ 
A. Historical Background 
Traditionally, when a non-judicial tribunal acts in a quasi-judicial 
manner, its determinations are entitled to the same effect as a duly ren- 
dered judicial determinati~n.~' In 1952, the Court of Appeals granted 
preclusive effect to a determination by a Workmen's Compensation 
Board when the same issue was raised in a subsequent negligence ac- 
t i ~ n . ~ '  The court held that since the employer had successfully contested 
the claim before the Workmen's Compensation Board, the employer 
could not interpose a contrary defense in a tort action pending in a judi- 
cial forum.72 Nonetheless, the court did not preclude the employer de- 
cases. Schwartz, 24 N.Y.2d at 72, 246 N.E.2d at 729, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 961. In addition 
to a vigorous fight on the issue of liability, each of the plaintiffs "had a full opportunity to 
tell his story at the first trial. . . ." Id., 246 N.E.2d at 730, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 961. None 
claimed a "lack of adequate representation." Id., 246 N.E.2d at 730,298 N.Y.S.2d at 961. 
Nor was any one able to show "prejudice because of the forum of the earlier action." Id., 
246 N.E.2d at 730, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 961, nor that his adversary had "any tactical advan- 
tages." Id., 246 N.E.2d at 730, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 961. The court held that, "[ilt is, there- 
fore, utterly fair to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel here and to the typical case 
where driver sues driver following a verdict by a passenger against both." Id. at 72-73, 
246 N.E.2d at 730, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 961. See supra notes 44-52 and accompanying t a t .  
67. See People v. Plevy, 52 N.Y.2d 58, 65, 417 N.E.2d 518, 522, 436 N.Y.S.2d 224, 
228 (1980). Although Plevy had been given due process in the sense that he had had a 
full opportunity to testify, the Court of Appeals noted that: "other circumstances which. 
although not legal impediments, may have had the pnctiwl effect of discouraging or 
deterring a party from fully litigating the determination which is now asserted against 
him." Id. 417 N.E.2d at 522, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 228 (citing Schwartz v. Public Adm'r. 24 
N.Y.2d 65, 246 N.E.2d 725, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1969)). 
68. See Koch v. Consolidated Edison Co., 62 N.Y.2d 548, 555 n.4. 468 N.E2d 1, 4 
1~4 ,479  N.Y.S.2d 163, 166 n.4 (1984) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments S; 29 
(1982)), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1177 (1985). 
69. Id. at 556, 468 N.E.2d 1, 5, 479 N.Y.S.2d 163, 167 (judicial determinations may 
be inconsistent with "those in cases tried in the Small Claims Part of the Civil Coun of 
New York City as to which informal and simplified procedures are applicable. . . ."I: see 
also irzfra note 172 and accompanying text. 
70. See D. Siegel, supra note 2, at $ 456 (citing Evans v. hlonaghan. 306 N.Y. 312. 
118 N.E.2d 452 (1954)). See also 5 J .  Weinstein. H. Korn 6: A. hliller. slrpro note 2. at a 
501 1.23, 11.210. 
71. See Ogino v. Black. 304 N.Y. 872, 873. 109 N.E.2d 884. 884 (1952). 
72. See id.. 109 N.E.2d at 884 (because Workmen's Cornpensiltion Board de te rn~i~ id  
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fendant from contesting the issue of his alleged liability.73 
Two years later, the Court of Appeals articulated its reasons for giving 
administrative agency decisions preclusive effect in subsequent judicial 
 proceeding^.^^ Although the court pointed out that the rule of res judi- 
cata should be applicable in administrative determinations, it refused to 
apply the doctrine in light of newly discovered evidence.75 In subsequent 
cases, the Court of Appeals continued to suggest that general principles 
of res judicata were applicable to adminstrative decisions.76 The Court of 
Appeals has noted, however, that the decision whether to grant such de- 
terminations preclusive effect proved remarkably elusive.77 
B. Granting Preclusive Eflect to Adminstrative Determinations 
In Ryan v. New York Telephone C O . , ~ ~  the Court of Appeals held that 
the determinations of an administrative agency have preclusive effect in 
subsequent judicial  proceeding^.^^ Ryan was discharged by the New 
York Telephone Company after being arrested for theft of company 
property. The arrest was based on the testimony of two security investi- 
gators who claimed that Ryan had removed company property from the 
accidental injuries did not arise out of plaintiff-employee's course of employment, defend- 
ant-employer could not claim that Workmen's Compensation Law was plaintiff's exclu- 
sive remedy). 
73. See id., 109 N.E.2d at 884. 
74. See Evans v. Monaghan, 306 N.Y. 312, 323-26, 118 N.E.2d 452, 457-59 (1954). 
The court stated that: 
Security of person and property requires that determinations in the field of ad- 
ministrative law should be given as much finality as is reasonably possible. The 
. . . rule of resjudicata is applicable . . . wherever consistent with the purposes of 
the tribunal, board or officer. . . . Indeed, it is the instinct of our jurisprudence 
to extend court principles to administrative or quasi-judicial hearings insofar as 
they may be adapted to such procedures. 
Id. at 323-24, 118 N.E.2d at 457-58 (citation omitted). 
75. Id. at 324, 118 N.E.2d at 458 ("The unsealing of Harry Gross' lips after he had 
refused to testify at the first departmental trial, is tantamount to newly discovered evi- 
dence."); see also N.Y. Times, The Lonely Death of a Man Who Made a Scandal, April 5, 
1986 at L1, col. 1 (traces rise and fall of Harry Gross and the scandal which prompted 
the departure of Police Commissioner William P. O'Brien and other city officials and the 
resignation of Mayor William O'Dwyer). 
76. See Capital Tel. Co. v. Pattersonville Tel. Co., 56 N.Y.2d 11, 15-16, 436 N.E.2d 
461, 462-63, 451 N.Y.S.2d 11, 12-13 (1982); Venes v. Community School Bd., 43 N.Y.2d 
520, 524, 373 N.E.2d 987, 989, 402 N.Y.S.2d 807, 809 (1978). 
77. See Venes v. Community School Bd., 43 N.Y.2d 520, 523, 373 N.E.2d 987, 989, 
402 N.Y.S.2d 807, 808-09 (1978). 
78. 62 N.Y.2d 494, 467 N.E.2d 487, 478 N.Y.S.2d 823 (1984). 
79. Id. at 505,467 N.E.2d at 493, N.Y.S.2d at 829. The Court of Appeals decision to 
give preclusive effect in a judicial forum to an administrative determination followed the 
lead of several earlier decisions by federal courts in New York and the New York Stnte 
appellate divisions. See, e.g., Mitchell v. National Broadcasting Co., 553 F.2d 265, 268-69 
(2d Cir. 1977); DeSimone v. South African Marine Corp., 82 A.D.2d 820, 821, 439 
N.Y.S.2d 436,438 (2d Dep't 1981); Newsday, Inc. v. Ross, 80 A.D.2d 1, 5,437 N.Y.S.2d 
376, 379 (2d Dep't 1981); Bernstein v. Birch Wathen School, 71 A.D.2d 129, 132, 421 
N.Y.S.2d 574, 575 (1st Dep't 1979), aff'd, 51 N.Y.2d 932, 415 N.E.2d 982,434 N.Y.S.2d 
994 (1 980); Blanco v. Blum, 67 A.D.2d 947,948,413 N.Y.S.2d 2 15, 2 16 (2d Dep't 1979). 
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workplace. After his discharge, Ryan applied for unemployment insur- 
ance benefits, but his application was rejected by a claims examiner on 
the ground that the discharge was the result of Ryan's own misconduct. 
Ryan fled an administrative appeal and was granted a hearing before 
an Unemployment Insurance Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ").so Af- 
ter considering the testimony of Ryan and the hearsay testimony of one 
witness, the ALJ sustained the ruling of the claims examiner and found 
that the " 'claimant was seen . . . removing company property from the 
company premises.' "'I The ALJ then affirmed the denial of Ryan's un- 
employment benefits. This ruling was affirmed by the Unemployment 
Insurance Appeal Board, and upheld by the Appellate Divi~ion.'~ Prior 
to the Appellate Division's affirmation of the administrative determina- 
tion, Ryan filed a tort action for false arrest, malicious prosecution, slm- 
der and wrongful discharge. The defendant raised an affirmative defense 
that because this action turned on the question of Ryan's misconduct, res 
judicata barred relitigation of the issue. The affirmative defense was dis- 
missed by the Special Term and the Appellate Division affirmed.83 The 
Court of Appeals reversed, holding that issue preclusion a p ~ l i e d . ~  
The Ryan decision illustrates the increasing level of respect given by 
the Court of Appeals to administrative  determination^.^' The Court of 
Appeals, using the terms issue preclusion and claim preclusion inter- 
changeably, first stressed that res judicata was founded upon the belief 
that it is in the public's interest to finalize litigati~n.'~ It then stated that 
the controlling factor for issue preclusion is "the identity of the issue 
which has necessarily been decided in the prior a~tion."~' The court 
found that the identity of issue test had been met. It recognized that the 
agency's determinations that Ryan was guilty of stealing company prop- 
erty and was terminated for cause, were essential factors in deciding the 
validity of his tort claims." As these issues were material to the adminis- 
trative determination and decisive to the claim raised by Ryan in his law- 
suit, the doctrine of issue preclusion could be invoked to prevent their 
relitigati~n.'~ 
The court pointed out that Ryan had testified on his own behalf and, 
through his union representative, had cross-examined the defendant's 
80. See Ryan v. New York Tel. Co., 62 N.Y.2d 494,497-98.467 N.E.2d 487,489,478 
N.Y.S.2d 823. 825 (1984). 
81. See id: at 498, 467 N.E.2d at 489, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 825 (quoting findings of the 
ALJ) (ellipsis in original). 
82. See id., 467 N.E.2d at 489, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 825. 
83. See id. at 498-99, 467 N.E.2d at 489. 478 N.Y.S.2d at 825. 
84. See id. at 505, 467 N.E.2d at 493, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 829. 
85. See D. Siege], supra note 2, 3 456, at 95 (Supp. 1985). 
86. Ryan v. New York Tel. Co., 62 N.Y.2d 494, 500, 467 N.E.2d 487, 490, 478 
N.Y.S.2d 823, 826 (1984). 
87. Id., 467 N.E.2d at 490, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 826. 
88. See id. at 502, 467 N.E.2d at 490, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 827-28. 
89. Id. at 500-03, 467 N.E.2d at 490-92, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 826-28. 
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witnesses at the hearing.90 In addition, the court noted that Ryan had 
voluntarily initiated the hearing, knowingly chose to appear before it 
without legal counsel and that the hearing was held before an ALJ. 
Moreover, the record demonstrated to the court that the administrative 
procedure was fair and that Ryan had a full opportunity to litigate the 
issue of m i s c o n d ~ c t . ~ ~  Thus, the court held that the prior litigation had 
been sufficiently extensive and adversarial to constitute a full and fair 
hearing.92 
In contrast to the court's findings, the circumstances surrounding the 
prior litigation suggest that Ryan was inadequately represented before 
the ALJ and, therefore, had been denied a full and fair opportunity to 
litigate the issue at the previous hearing. Ryan's union representative 
was not an attorney; and it is unlikely that Ryan, who was on welfare,93 
could have afforded legal counsel.94 Additionally, Ryan's representative 
was frequently interrupted by the ALJ and continually urged to complete 
his case.95 The Court of Appeals did not explain how the full and fair 
opportunity requirement could be satisfied in a proceeding conducted 
without the benefit of pre-trial disclosure or formal rules of evidence. 
Nor did the court discuss the differences between appellate review of evi- 
dentiary rulings in administrative and judicial forums.96 
There are substantial procedural differences between judicial and ad- 
ministrative forums.97 These differences were underscored by the ALJ's 
insistence that the hearing was not a trial.98 Furthermore, the ALJ lim- 
90. Id. at 503, 467 N.E.2d at 492, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 828. 
91. Id. at 503-04, 467 N.E.2d at 492, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 828. 
92. Id., 467 N.E.2d at 492, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 828. 
93. Record on Appeal at 21, Ryan v. New York Tel. Co., 62 N.Y.2d 494,467 N.E.2d 
487, 478 N.Y.S.2d 823 (1984); see Plaintiff-Respondents Brief at 5, Ryan v. New York 
Tel. Co., 62 N.Y.2d 494, 467 N.E.2d 487, 478 N.Y.S.2d 823 (1984). 
94. The court has indicated that it will not apply issue preclusion against a defendant 
who testified at, but was not a party to, an administrative hearing. Preclusion was not 
granted because such a person lacks control over his testimony, the opportunity for cross- 
examination and the guidance of counsel, see Liss v. Trans Auto Supply Co., 68 N.Y.2d 
15, 22, 496 N.E.2d 851, 856, 505 N.Y.S.2d 831, 836 (1986), the Ryan decision suggests 
that such counsel need not be an attorney. See Ryan v. New York Tel. Co., 62 N.Y.2d 
494, 503-04, 467 N.E.2d 487, 492, 478 N.Y.S.2d 823, 828 (1984). 
95. Record on Appeal at 60-61, 69-70, 72-73, 78, 81-82, 88, 101, Ryan v. New York 
Tel. Co., 62 N.Y.2d 494, 467 N.E.2d 487, 478 N.Y.S.2d 823 (1984). 
96. See 8 J. Weinstein, H. Korn & A. Miller, New York Civil Practice, at 9 7803.02 
and nn.6-9, fl 7803.04. See generally 0. Chase, supra note 17, at 95 26.04-.06 (discussing 
questions available for review by appellate courts once the appeal is properly filed); id. nt 
9 32.04 (issues available for review in an Article 78 proceeding). Since judicial review is 
limited to the administrative record, matters such as objections relating to henrslry evi- 
dence and failure to comply with the rules of evidence cannot be considered. 
97. See N.Y. Comp. R. & Reg. tit. 12(c) 9 461.4 (1982) ("[tlhe administrntive law 
judge shall not be bound by common law or statutory rules of evidence or by technical or 
formal rules of procedure."); cf: D. Siegel, supra note 2, at 9 597 ("the usual evidentiary 
rules applicable in court are waived in arbitration"). 
98. See Record on Appeal at 67, Ryan v. New York Tel. Co., 62 N.Y.2d 494, 467 
N.E.2d 487, 478 N.Y.S.2d 823 (1984) ("this isn't a criminal trial"). 
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ited cross-examination of the only witness testifying against R ~ a n . ~  
Much of this witness' testimony was based on h e a r ~ a y , ' ~  and the A U  
refused to allow an adjournment that would have permitted a witness 
having direct knowledge of Ryan's alleged misconduct to testify.lO' The 
hearing's transcript implies that no one contemplated that an issue deter- 
mination by an ALJ would be dispositive of Ryan's tort claim in a judi- 
cial forum.'02 
In Brugman v City of New York,'03 the Court of Appeals gave preclu- 
sive effect to an administrative determination that rested soley on written 
documents and was conducted without a hearing of any type.Iol Both 
the Supreme Court and the Appellate Division affirmed the New York 
City Employee's Retirement System (NYCERS) administrative decision 
denying Brugman's application for accidental disability status.'os In a 
subsequent tort action to recover damages resulting from the incident 
considered before the NYCERS, the defendants moved to amend their 
answer to assert issue preclusion as an affirmative defense. The motion 
was granted and Brugman's tort action was dismissed.'06 Special Term's 
decision was affirmed by the Appellate Division with a dissenting opin- 
99. See id at 67 ("I understand all the lighting and the distance have to do with the 
quality of the testimony, but I ask you to keep dl your questions relevant."); id. at 103 
("I don't feel-whether or not he feels the witness is lying is necessary to todays [sic] 
hearing"). 
100. Record on Appeal at 74-76, Ryan v. New York Tel. Co.. 62 N.Y.2d 494. 467 
N.E.2d 487, 478 N.Y.S.2d 823 (1984); see also id. at 195 (use of hearsay testimony at 
administrative hearing attacked in claimant's brief to appellate division). 
101. Id. at 101. 
102. See supra notes 93-101 and accompanying text. 
103. 64 N.Y.2d 101 1,478 N.E.2d 195, 489 N.Y.S.2d 54 (1985). 
104. During the pendency of Bagman's action to recover damages for injuries alleg- 
edly sustained on August 30, 1979, Bagman v. City of New York, 102 A.D.2d 41 3,413, 
477 N.Y.S.2d 636, 636 (1st Dep't 1984), aff'd, 64 N.Y.2d 1011, 478 N.E2d 195, 489 
N.Y.S.2d 54 (1985), which Bagman claimed occurred while he was working as a sanita- 
tion worker, Record on Appeal at 24-25, 49, 86, 90, Bagman v. City of New York. 64 
N.Y.2d 1011,478 N.E.2d 195,489 N.Y.S.2d 54 (1985), the Board of Trustees of the New 
York City Employee's Retirement System ("NYCERS") denied Bagman's application 
for accidental disability status on the grounds that Bagman's accident reports and hospi- 
tal records indicated that the injury was the result of lifting heavy garbage containers. 
Record on Appeal at 53, 56,66,67, Bagman v. City of New York, 64 N.Y.2d 101 1,478 
N.E.2d 195,489 N.Y.S.2d 54 (1985) (No. 80-6935). Bagman then resubmitted his appli- 
cation, supported by photographs of the accident site and the sworn statement of a wit- 
ness to the accident, see id. at 73-77, but the Board dhmed  its previous decision, see id. 
at 98-99, primarily basing its affirmation on two letters from doctors who examined the 
patient. See id. at 56-57, 11 1. One of these letters relied on by the Board stated. "[Iln my 
opinion, the conclusion reached by Dr. Cheung with regard to the relationship of this 
patient's condition to the incident when he developed pain on his back while lifting a can 
is a totally unwarranted conclusion." Id. at 11 1 (emphasis added). This apparently contn- 
dicts the Board's conclusion. 
105. See Bagman v. Board of Trustees, 91 A.D.2d 872, 458 N.Y.S.Zd 965 (1st Dep't 
1982). 
106. Bagman v. City of New York, 102 A.D.2d 413,419,477 N.Y.S.2d 636.640 (1st 
Dep't 1984), aff'd, 62 N.Y.2d 101 1, 478 N.E.2d 195,489 N.Y.S.2d 54 (1985). 
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ion.''' The dissent argued that the procedures followed by the NYCERS 
Board did not satisfy the full and fair opportunity requirement because 
they were not "substantially similar to those used in a court of law."'08 
The majority concluded, however, that issue preclusion was proper be- 
cause the issues presented in both forums were identical and Brugman 
had failed to show that he was denied a full and fair opportunity to liti- 
gate the issues before the NYCERS Board.'09 The majority also stressed 
that the administrative determination by the NYCERS was affirmed in 
three administrative proceedings, and reviewed in a special judicial 
proceeding. ' lo 
The Court of Appeals, in a memorandum opinion, unanimously 
adopted the majority's position. I '  Implicit in the Brugman decision is 
the court's determination that the full and fair opportunity requirement 
can be satisfied on the basis of a paper record, without the application of 
formal rules of evidence. ' l2  
In Liss v. Trans Auto Systems, "3 the Court of Appeals clarified the 
extent to which administrative determinations are given preclusive effect. 
The court held that issue preclusion could not be applied against a de- 
fendant who was neither a partyM4 nor a party in interestH5 to the ad- 
ministrative hearing. I t  recognized that the full and fair opportunity 
requirement cannot be satisfied without the occasion to present evidence 
107. Id. at 419, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 640. 
108. Id. at 420, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 641 (Silverman, J., dissenting) (quoting Ryan v. New 
York Tel. Co., 62 N.Y.2d 494,499,467 N.E.2d 487,490,478 N.Y.S.2d 823, 826 (1984)). 
The dissent argued that, "[tlhe administrative forum must have the 'essential procedural 
characteristics of a court.' The procedure of the Retirement System does not meet these 
requirements . . . there is no court-like hearing-no examination and cross-examintion of 
witnesses, no presiding officer performing the functions of a judge, no 'adversary proceed- 
ing.' " Id. at 420-21, 477 N.Y.S.2d 641 (Silverman, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
109. Id. at 415, 417-18, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 639. 
110. Id. at 415, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 637. 
1 1 1. Brugman v. City of New York, 64 N.Y.2d 101 1, 1012,478 N.E.2d 195, 196,489 
N.Y.S.2d 54, 55 (1985). The Court of Appeals pointed out that the plaintiff had "no 
occasion for cross-examination." Id. at 1012, 478 N.E.2d at 196, 489 N.Y.S.2d at 55. 
Thus, the court implicitly adopted the Appellate Division's contention that the full and 
fair opportunity requirement could be applied to administrative determinations absent "a 
court-like hearing [and the] examination or cross-examination of witnesses." See 
Brugman v. City of New York, 102 A.D.2d 413,417,477 N.Y.S.2d 636, 639 (1st Dcp't 
1984), aff'd, 64 N.Y.2d 1011, 478 N.E.2d 195, 489 N.Y.S.2d 54 (1985). 
112. See Brugman v. City of New York, 64 N.Y.2d 101 1, 1012,478 N.E.2d 195, 196, 
489 N.Y.S.2d 54, 55 (1985); supra notes 103-10 and accompanying text. The Brrignlarr 
court reasoned that since plaintiff was the only witness before the Board, cross examina- 
tion was unnecessary. Additionally, plaintiff admitted on argument that "he had no 
other evidence to present and was unaware of any evidence that might be discoverable." 
Brugman, 64 N.Y.2d at 1012, 478 N.E.2d at 196, 489 N.Y.S.2d at 55. Thus, the court 
held that, in this case, the full and fair opportunity requirement was satisfied absent these 
procedures. See id., 478 N.E.2d at 196, 489 N.Y.S.2d at 55. 
113. 68 N.Y.2d 15, 496 N.E.2d 851, 505 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1986). 
114. See id. at 18, 496 N.E.2d at 853, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 833. 
115. See id. at 22, 496 N.E.2d at 855, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 835. 
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and to cross-examine witnesses.'I6 Additionally even if the party against 
whom preclusion is sought testified at the hearing, he must have had 
both the opportunity to control the development of his testimony and the 
guidance of counsel."' 
C. Granting Preclusive Eflect to Arbitral Determinations 
In Clemens v. Apple,"8 the Court of Appeals afiirmed the Appellate 
Division's decision granting preclusive effect to an issue determined at an 
arbitration before a Health Services Administrative (HSA) Panel,'I9 not- 
ing that the decision was fully consistent with Ryan v. New York Tele- 
phone CO.'~O The court emphasized that the full and fair opportunity 
requirement had been satisfied, stressing that Clemens, who was repre- 
sented by counsel, freely chose arbitration after the commencement of his 
personal injury action. It concluded that Clemens, therefore, could have 
foreseen the possibility that an adverse arbitral award would preclude 
relitigation of the causal factors relating to his suit."' 
In Clemens, the HSA Arbitration Panel based its decision on an infor- 
mal fifteen minute hearing before a two-doctor Panel that did not call 
any witnesses.IZ2 In addition, the substantive and procedural law of New 
York were not binding on the HSA Panel and the judicial review avail- 
able was far less stringent than for administrative determinations.'" 
The Clemens decision suggests a shift in emphasis by the Court of Ap- 
peals from achieving a just result for litigants to conserving of judicial 
resources.'24 This shift has serious policy implications. For example, 
making the results of an issue determination at a voluntary arbitration 
116. See id., 496 N.E.2d at 855, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 835. 
117. See id., 496 N.E.2d at 856, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 836. Bur see supra note 94 and ac- 
companying text (guidance need not be provided by attorney). 
118. 65 N.Y.2d 746,481 N.E.2d 560, 492 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1985). 
119. Clemens v. Apple, 102 A.D.2d 236,477 N.Y.S.2d 774 (3d Dep't 1984), off'd, 65 
N.Y.2d 746,481 N.E.2d 560,492 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1985). The Appellate Division held "it is 
apparent from the record that Clemens was accorded a full and fair opportunity to liti- 
gate his claim . . . ." Id. at 237, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 775. 
120. See Clemens v. Apple, 65 N.Y.2d 746, 748,481 N.E.2d 560, 560, 492 N.Y.S.2d 
- - 
20, 20 (1985). 
121. See id. at 749, 481 N.E.2d at 561, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 21. 
122. Record on Appeal at 68-69, Clemens v. Apple, 65 N.Y.2d 746,481 N-E2d 560, 
492 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1985) (plaintiff's affidavit in opposition to defendant's motion for par- 
tial summary judgment). The report on which the arbitrators relied was based on one 
brief examination of Clemens on January 19, 1978, where a doctor stated that: "[tlhe 
~atient's diamosis at this time is a cervical s~ra in  secondarv to his automobile accident 
: . . ." Id. i t  49. The other report, which ;vas not utilized by the panel, related the 
herniated disc injury to the automobile accident, was based on a continunl series of treat- 
ments from May 18, 1979 through February 18, 1980. Id. at 74-83. 
123. Compare N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. 4 751 1 (McKinney 1981) (governing review of 
arbitral decisions) with N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. 4 7803 (McKinney 1981) (governing 
review of administrative determinations). See D. Siegal, Expanding Applications of Col- 
lateral Estoppel (Issue Preclusion), 310 N.Y. St. L. Dig. 1 (1985). 
124. See Vestal, Res Judicata/Preclusion: Exparrsiorr, 47 S. Col. L. Rev. 357. 359 
(1974) (judicial economy furthered through granting of issue preclusion). 
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binding at a subsequent litigation may discourage the use of arbitration, 
and encourage the use of the courts, defeating the court's attempt to re- 
duce ~0nges t ion . l~~  Well-advised plaintiffs may forego a simplified deter- 
mination of disputes with their carriers, while uninformed plaintiffs may 
be bound by decisions of arbitrators, made without the procedural safe- 
guards present in judicial forums.126 Finally, this shift might impose un- 
anticipated hardships on accident victims. 12' 
111. POLICY ANALYSIS OF THE APPLICATION OF ISSUE PRECLUSION 
TO ADMINISTRATIVE AND ARBITRAL DETERMINATIONS 
The policies supporting the doctrine of issue preclusion128 include soci- 
ety's desire to: (1) promote fairness;129 (2) prevent inconsistent judgments 
and to achieve uniformity and certainty;130 (3) finalize disputes among 
the parties;13' and (4) conserve judicial resources.132 This section will 
analyze the Court of Appeals' expansion of the doctrine's scope'33 in 
terms of the interaction of these considerations to guide the courts in 
granting preclusive effect administrative and arbitral issue determina- 
tions in subsequent judicial litigations. 
A. Consideration of Fairness 
Concepts of fair play and due process have consistently been important 
125. CJ University of Tenn. v. Elliot, 106 S. Ct. 3220, 3228 (1986) (Stevens, J., concur- 
ring in part and dissenting in part) (litigants may forego state administrative determinu- 
tions as a result of their fear of future preclusive effect). 
126. Cf: id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
127. See infra Parts 111-IV. 
128. See supra notes 7-20 and accompanying text. 
129. See Ryan v. New York Tel. Co., 62 N.Y.2d 494, 500-01, 467 N.E.2d 487, 490-91, 
478 N.Y.S.2d 823, 826-27 (1984) (issue preclusion only applies when issue has been fairly 
litigated); Gilberg v. Barbieri, 53 N.Y.2d 285, 291, 423 N.E.2d 807, 808, 441 N.Y.S.2d 
49, 50 (1981) (same); People v. Plevy, 52 N.Y.2d 58, 64, 417 N.E.2d 518, 521, 436 
N.Y.S.2d 224, 227 (1980) (same); Schwartz v. Public Adm'r, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 69, 246 
N.E.2d 725, 727-28, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955, 958 (1969) (same). 
130. See Ryan v. New York Tel. Co., 62 N.Y.2d 494, 501, 467 N.E.2d 487, 490, 478 
N.Y.S.2d 823, 826 (1984) (issue preclusion applies when different result in second pro- 
ceeding would destroy rights created in first). 
131. See id. at 500,467 N.E.2d at 490,478 N.Y.S.2d at 826 (1984) ("[Olnce . . . tried, 
all litigation of that question, and between those parties, should be closed forever." (quot- 
ing Fish v. Vanderlip, 218 N.Y. 29, 36-37, 112 N.E. 425,428 (1916) (quoting Greenleaf's 
Evidence $$ 522, 523)); People v. Plevy, 52 N.Y.2d 58, 64, 417 N.E.2d 518, 521, 436 
N.Y.S.2d 224, 227 (1980) (doctrine provides means for swift resolution of disputes); 
Venes v. Community School Bd., 43 N.Y.2d 520, 523-24, 373 N.E.2d 987, 989, 402 
N.Y.S.2d 807, 809 (1978) (decisions need to be granted as much finality as possible) (cit- 
ing Matter of Evans v. Monaghan, 306 N.Y. 312, 323-24, 118 N.E.2d 452, 457-58 
(1954)). 
132. See Gilberg v. Barbieri, 53 N.Y.2d 285, 291, 423 N.E.2d 807, 808, 441 N.Y.S.2d 
49, 50 (1981) (doctrine conserves resources of courts and litigant). See sirpra notes 2-4 
and accompanying text. 
133. See D. Siege], supra note 2, $456 95, (Supp. 1985). 
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policy considerations for courts when considering issue preclusion.IM 
These considerations are manifest in the Court of Appeals' "full and fair 
opportunity" test which requires the court to consider such factors as, 
the forum of the prior litigation, the foreseeability of the subsequent ac- 
tion the size of the plaintiff's claim and the ability of the party's 
counsel. ' 3 5  
Satisfaction of the full and fair opportunity test requires more than 
traditional notions of due process and fair play.'36 In Parklane Hosiery v. 
Shore,I3' the Supreme Court admonished that issue preclusion should 
seldom be applied if a second forum affords a party procedural opportu- 
nities, such as full discovery and the benefit of evidentiary rules, that 
were unavailable in the first forum and could cause a different result.'3s 
The Ryan court, balancing the consideration of fairness and the need for 
finality, cited Parklane to support its invocation of issue preclu~ion. '~~ 
The Court of Appeals did not, however, establish standards for determin- 
ing what administrative or arbitral procedures, if any, are necessary for 
satisfaction of the full and fair opportunity requirement.Ia Implicit in 
134. See supra notes 11, 129 and accompanying text; see also Parklane Hosiery Co. v. 
Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979) (fairness dictates when offensive use of doctrine permit- 
ted); Capital Tel. Co. v. Pattersonville Tel. Co., 56 N.Y.2d 11, 21, 436 N.E.2d 461, 465, 
451 N.Y.S.2d 11, 15 (1982) (plaintiffs did not have a full and fair opportunity to contest 
the issue because no evidentiary hearing was held); Venes v. Community School Bd.. 43 
N.Y.2d 520, 524-25, 373 N.E.2d 987, 989, 402 N.Y.S.2d 807, 809 (1978) (determination 
of a school board not acting in a quasi-judicial capacity should not be given res judiuta 
effect). 
135. See supra notes 20, 65-69 and accompanying text. 
136. People v. Plevy, 52 N.Y.2d 58, 65,417 N.E2d 5 18, 522,436 N.Y.S.2d 224,228 
(1980) ("when the application of collateral estoppel is at issue, any question as to whether 
a party had 'a full and fair opportunity' to litigate the prior determination is not con- 
cluded by a finding that there was no violation of due process"). 
137. 439 U.S. 322 (1979). 
138. Id. 330-31. In Parklane. the Supreme Court permitted offensive use of non- 
mutual issue preclusion by plaintiff stockholders who, although they were not parties or 
privies to an earlier adjudication by the SEC, sought to preclude the defendants from 
relitigating the issue of an alleged violation of federal securities laws. Parklane has gener- 
ated extensive commentary of its own. See, eg.. Collen & &due, To Bury .Murualir): 
Not to Praise It: an Analysis of Collateral Estoppel Afer  Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore. 3 1 
Hastings L.J. 755 (1980); Flanagan, Oflensive Collateral Esroppel: Ineficiency and Foolish 
Consistency, 1982 Ariz. St. L.J. 45; Kempkes, Issue Preclusion: Parklane Hosiery Co. v. 
Shore Revisited, 3 1 Drake L. Rev. 11 1 (1981). Prior to Parklane the Supreme Court had 
granted preclusive effect to administrative findings. See United States v. Utah Constr. & 
Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 400-01, 418-19 (1966) (an administrative contract appeals 
agency made factual findings which were later held as conclusive, on principles of issue 
preclusion, in a civil action). As commentators have noted, after Utah federal couns have 
often held that precluding relitigation of administrative issue determinations is a useful 
tool for reducing caseloads. See, kg., Perschbacher, Retitinking Collateral Estoppel: Lim- 
iting the Preclusive Effect of Administrative Determinations in Judicial Proceedings, 35 U. 
Ha. L. Rev. 422, 432-444, Note, The Collateml Estoppel Eflect of Administrative Agency 
Actions in Federal Civil Litigation, 46 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 65. 70-71 (1977). 
139. Ryan v. New York Tel. Co., 62 N.Y.2d 494, 499, 467 N.E.2d 487, 489, 478 
N.Y.S.2d 823, 825 (1984). 
140. Cf: McDonald v. City of W. Branch. 466 U.S. 284. 290-92 (1984) (United States 
Supreme Court analyzed arbitral procedures and concluded that they were not sufficient 
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the Court of Appeals' granting preclusive effect to the administrative de- 
terminations in Ryan 141 and Brugman 14* and the arbitral determinations 
in Clernen~, '~~ is the notion that the requirement can be satisfied without 
pre-trial discovery or formal application of the rules of evidence. This 
raises the question of whether litigants should be deprived of rights tradi- 
tionally guaranteed them by our adversarial system.'44 
There are several advantages to extensive discovery: it assures fairness 
to the litigants and prevents surprises it encourages settlements and it 
usually improves both the efficiency of a trial or hearing and the quality 
of the decision made therein.145 In New York, administrative agencies 
are not required to permit discovery.146 Agency decisions to prohibit or 
limit a party's discovery rights do not violate due process.14' Thus, a 
litigant is not guaranteed access to relevant and nonprivileged informa- 
tion which is in the exclusive possession of his adversary. This may pre- 
vent him from developing or formulating issues as he would in a court of 
to apply issue preclusion in federal court to unappealed arbitration awards in actions 
brought under 42 U.S.C. 8 1983); Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461,483- 
85 (1982) (in confirming issue preclusion bar of Title VII claim, the Court analyzed pano- 
ply of administrative procedures followed by New York State and concluded they were 
sufficient under due process clause.). But see University of Tenn. v. Elliot, 106 S. Ct. 
3220, 3227 (1986) ("me hold that when a state agency 'acting in a judicial capacity . . . 
resolves disputed issue of fact properly before it which the parties have had an adequate 
opportunity to litigate' . . . federal courts must give the agency's factfinding the same 
preclusive effect to which it would be entitled in state courts.") (citations omitted). 
Commentators have suggested that the full and fair opportunity requirement, which 
the Court of Appeals has extended beyond terms of traditional notions of due process, 
contemplates full disclosure and trial-like procedures. See supra note 24 and accompany- 
ing text. Thus, although neither the N.Y. State Administrative Procedure Act (A.P.A.) 
nor case law requires that administrative procedure conform with traditional judicial 
models, satisfaction of the full and fair opportunity requirement places a higher burden of 
procedural fairness upon administrative and arbitral tribunals. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 
424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976) uudicial mode of an evidentiary hearing is not required prior to 
the termination of disability benefits); Schwartz, Adtninistrative Law, 36 Syracuse L. Rev. 
1, 5-6 (1985) (although "not governed by rules of evidence, . . . basic principles of fairness 
do apply"). To meet this burden, the party invoking issue preclusion should be required 
to show that the administrative or arbitral determination was sufficiently court-like to 
rebut the presumption against applying the doctrine to such decisions. See infra note 212 
and accompanying text. 
141. Ryan v. New York Tel. Co., 62 N.Y.2d 494,467 N.E.2d 487,478 N.Y.S.2d 823 
(1984). 
142. Brugman v. City of New York, 64 N.Y.2d 101 1,478 N.E.2d 195,489 N.Y.S.2d 
54 (1985). 
143. Clemens v. Apple, 65 N.Y.2d 746, 481 N.E.2d 560, 492 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1985). 
144. See generally Morgan, Playing by the Rules: Due Process and Errors of Stare Pro- 
cedural Law, 63 Wash. U.L.Q. 1, 17-24 (1985). 
145. See generally C. Wright, Law of Federal Courts, 8 81, at 540-44 (1976). 
146. See Heim v. Regan, 90 A.D.2d 656,657,456 N.Y.S.2d 257,258 (3d Dep't 1982); 
N.Y. A.P.A., 8 305 (McKinney 1984) ("Each agency having power to conduct adjudica- 
tory proceedings may adopt rules providing for discovery and depositions to the extent 
and in the manner appropriate to its proceedings." (emphasis added)); infra note 188 and 
accompanying text. 
147. See N.Y. A.P.A. 8 305 (McKinney 1984); supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
Heinonline - -  55 Fordham L. Rev. 86 1986-1987 
19861 ISSUE PR ECL USION 87 
law. It is, therefore, questionable whether the full and fair opportunity 
test can be satisfied absent this procedure in the prior proceeding. 
Administrative tribunals are not bound by the rules of evidence.14' 
Rules of evidence define what is relevant and privileged in court proceed- 
ings; hearsay testimony is prohibited the plaintiff's burden of proof is 
measured by the preponderance of evidence standard, and the judicial 
and fact-finding roles are clearly differentiated.149 Thus, at administra- 
tive or arbitral hearings, an issue may be decided on the basis of evidence 
that would be inadmissible or insufficient in a court of law. 
To the extent that notions of efficiency and reduction of caseloads in- 
evitably conflict with concepts of fairness and substantial justice for the 
individual litigant, the nature of this conflict differs between judicial fo- 
rums and administrative or arbitral forums. Justice and fairness in judi- 
cial forums are viewed in terms of formal rituals supervised by an 
impartial and independent judiciary.'50 These rituals are governed by 
rules of evidence and procedure and by case law. Justice and fairness in 
administrative and arbitral forums, however, have traditionally been 
viewed in terms of permitting citizens access to a simplified, expedited 
and informal dispute resolution system.15' Indeed, elaborate pre-trial 
discovery and lengthy evidentiary hearings with technical rules of evi- 
dence are often inimical to achieving administrative and arbitral 
justice. 
Many hearing officers and administrative law judges are employed by 
the same agencies that promulgate the regulations that these officials are 
supposed to be applying in an impartial manner. Unlike judicial forums, 
agencies have tasks other than resolving judicial disputes.'53 Thus, 
148. See N.Y. A.P.A. 3 306 (McKinney 1984) (administrative tribunals not bound by 
the rules of evidence); supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text. 
149. See Schwartz, Administrative Law 3s 7.1, 7.2, 7.7-.10 (2d ed. 1984); Abramson, 
Administrative Procedures for Resolving Complex Policy Questions. a Proposal for Praof 
Dksection, 47 Alb. L. Rev. 1086, 1096 (1983). 
150. Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. Cal. L. Rev. 837, 852-54 (1984). 
151. See The APA, supra note 25, at 339 n.8. See also California Dep't of Human 
Resources Dev. v. Java, 402 U.S. 121, 135 (1971) (objective of Congress in creating the 
system for unemployment insurance was "getting money into the pocket of the unem- 
ployed worker at the earliest point that is administratively feasible"); The Record, supm 
note 24, at 740-42 ("Promptness in meeting the financial needs of the unemployed has 
always-and properly-been a critical concern of the unemployment insurance 
system."). 
152. See McDonald v. City of W. Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 290-92 (1984) (bemuse of 
deficiencies in arbitral fact finding, court refused to give preclusive effect to arbitration 
awards in 3 1983 actions); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36. 57-58 (1974) 
(informal procedures of arbitrations insufficient to protect feded  rights). C' California 
Dep't of Human Resources Dev. v. Java, 402 U.S. 121, 135 (1970) (purpose of unemploy- 
ment compensation hearing is getting money as quickly as possible to the unemployed 
worker at the earliest point that is administratively feasible); N.Y. A.P.A. 5 100 (McKin- 
ney 1984) (APA provides for simple, unifonn procedures). 
153. Gifford, The New York State Administrative Procedure Acc Some Reflections 
Upon Its Structure and Legislative History. 26 Buffalo L. Rev. 589. 614-20 (1977) (agency 
tasks include, inter alia, rulemaking, setting rates, and granting licenses). 
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agency determinations are influenced by the policies, aims, personalities, 
and sources of power sustaining the agency.lS4 This, again, raises the 
question of whether the full and fair opportunity standard permits grant- 
ing preclusive effect to such determinations on a wholesale basis. 
B. The Minimization of Inconsistent Judgments 
The belief that society desires to minimize inconsistent decisions is a 
significant historical justification for issue preclusion.155 Courts have, 
however, permitted the relitigation of issue determinations in subsequent 
actions, despite the risk of inconsistent results, on the grounds of sub- 
stantial justice and fairness.lS6 Indeed, the Court of Appeals has stressed 
that issue preclusion should not be applied when circumstances exist 
that, although not legal impediments, may have the practical effect of 
discouraging or deterring a party from fully litigating an issue."' The 
court has further stated that the invocation of issue preclusion should 
depend on the context in which the disputed facts were considered."" 
By emphasizing that "other circumstances" may cause facts in one pro- 
ceeding to have different meanings and consequences in another setting, 
the court has shown that concern about placing inconsistent duties on a 
party is more a function of claim preclusion than issue precl~sion.~ '~ 
154. See Heflin, A Question of Independence, 19 New Eng. L. Rev. 693, 694 (1984) 
("[s]ubtle forms of influence also exist, including budget control and assignment of omce 
space by the agency"); Levinson, The Proposed Administrative Law Judge Corps: An Itr- 
complete But Important Reform Effort, 19 New Eng. L. Rev. 733,734-35 (1984). But see 
The APA, supra note 25, at 350 nn.67-68 (in most respects ALJs are independent of the 
agency that employs them). 
155. See supra note 9 and accompanying text; see also Kaufman v. Eli Lilly & Co., 65 
N.Y.2d 449,455,482 N.E.2d 63, 67,492 N.Y.S.2d 584, 588 (1985) ("[Issue preclusion] is 
a doctrine intended to reduce litigation and conserve the resources of the court and liti- 
gants and it is based upon the general notion that it is not fair to permit a party to 
relitigate an issue that has already been decided against it."). 
156. See Shanley v. Callanan Indus., 54 N.Y.2d 52, 57, 427 N.E.2d 104, 107, 444 
N.Y.S.2d 585, 588 (1981) (issue of driver's negligence allowed to be relitigated); Gilberg 
v. Barbieri, 53 N.Y.2d 285, 29 1, 423 N.E.2d 807, 808, 441 N.Y.S.2d 49, 50 (198 1) (be- 
cause issue preclusion is rooted in fairness, "there are few immutable rules"); People v. 
Plevy, 52 N.Y.2d 58, 64, 417 N.E.2d 518, 521, 436 N.Y.S.2d 224, 227 (1980) ("The 
doctrine [issue preclusion], however, is not to be rigidly or mechanically applied arid 
must on occasion, yield to more fundamental concerns."). 
157. See People v. Plevy, 52 N.Y.2d 58, 65, 417 N.E.2d 518, 522, 436 N.Y.S.2d 224, 
228 (1980). 
158. See id. 
159. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments 5 26 (1982). The Restatement (Second) 
points out that "[tlhere is a close relationship between the definition of a 'claim' and the 
sweep of the rule of issue preclusion." Id. at 250. It notes: 
Courts laboring under a narrow view of the dimensions of a claim may on occa- 
sion have expanded concepts of issue preclusion in order to avoid relitigation of 
what is essentially the same dispute. Under a transaction approach to the con- 
cept of a claim, on the other hand, there is less need to rely on issue preclusion 
to put an end to the litigation of a particular controversy. 
Id. 
Thus since the Court of Appeals' adoption of the Restatement (Second) of Judge- 
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In Gilberg v. Barbieri,I6' the Court of Appeals held that a harassment 
conviction would not preclude relitigation of the same material issue in a 
civil lawsuit, despite the possibility of an inconsistent determination of 
the issue.161 The Gilberg court held that because the parties could not 
foresee that the conviction would later be used to establish conclusive 
liability in a $250,000 personal injury suit, they were not accorded a full 
and fair opportunity to litigate the i ~ s u e . ' ~ V h e  court also emphasized 
the brisk and informal manner of the prior hearing and observed that the 
defendant had neither the opportunity nor the incentive to litigate as 
thoroughly as he might have if the stakes had been greater.Ib3 This deci- 
sion is consistent both with earlier cases refusing to grant issue preclusion 
when a party could not foresee that the issue would arise in subsequent 
l i t i ga t i~n , '~~  and with the Court of Appeals decision in Koch v. Consoli- 
dated Edison Co. ,I6' where issue preclusion was granted on the grounds 
that the defendant should have foreseen that the same issue determina- 
tion in an earlier proceeding would be conclusive in later actions.IM 
ments' "transactional analysis" approach in Reilly v. Reid, 45 N.Y.2d 24. 29-30. 376 
N.E.2d 172, 175-76, 407 N.Y.S.2d 645, 648 (1978). it follows that the application of issue 
preclusion should be restricted, see also O'Brien v. City of Syracuse, 54 N.Y.7d 353,357, 
429 N.E.2d 1 158,1159, 445 N.Y.S.2d 687, 688 (198 1) (approving tnnsactional analysis). 
See Chase, Trends and Cross Trends in Res Judicara, N.Y.L.J., hlay 25. 1982, at 2, col. 4. 
160. 53 N.Y.2d 285, 423 N.E.2d 807,441 N.Y.S.2d 49 (1981). 
161. Id. at 294,423 N.E.2d at 810,441 N.Y.S.2d at 52. The Coun of Appeals framed 
the issue as ' 'Nhether  a conviction for the petty offense of harassment a n  later bc used 
to preclude the defendant from disputing the merits of a civil suit for isault. involving 
the same incident and seeking a quarter of a million dollars." Id. at 288.423 N.E2d at 
807,441 N.Y.S.2d at 49. A divided Court of Appeals refused to give conclusive cffccl to 
the prior determination beyond the proceeding in which it was made. See id. at 292.423 
N.E.2d at 809, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 51. The majority found that the defendant was afforded 
neither an opportunity nor an incentive to litigate the harassment conviction thoroughly 
or as thoroughly as he might have if more were at stake. See id. at 293, 423 N.E2d at 
810, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 52. The court noted that a contrary ruling would encourage civil 
litigants to file criminal complaints which would frustrate the very purpose of res judi- 
cata. See id. at 294,423 N.E.2d at 810, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 52. The coun also observed that 
future parties would be compelled to defend minor criminal charges with a vigor out of 
proportion to the charge and at variance with the proper function of the local criminal 
courts. See id., 423 N.E.2d at 810, 41 1 N.Y.S.2d at 52. 
162. See id., 423 N.E.2d at 810, 411 N.Y.S.2d at 52. 
163. See id. at 293, 423 N.E.2d at 8 10,441 N.Y.S.2d at 52. See also Parklane Hosiery 
Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 330 (1979) (it may be unfair to permit offensive use of sollat- 
era1 estoppel if defendant in first action was sued for nominal or small damages and 
subsequent lawsuit is unforeseeable because he may not have incentive to "defend 
vigorously"). 
164. See O'Conner v. G & R Packing Co., 53 N.Y.2d 278, 283,423 N.E.2d 397, 399, 
440 N.Y.S.2d 920, 922 (1981) (trial court did not examine foreseeability of later preclu- 
sion and thus its determination that plaintiff was contributorily negligent ~ v i b  not specifi- 
cally decided); Shanley v. Callanan Indus., 54 N.Y.2d 52. 56. 429 N.E.2d 104. 106. 444 
N.Y.S.2d 585, 587 (1981) ("The test of a full and fair opportunity to litigate is designed to 
assure that the party against whom collateral estoppel is being invoked his had all oppar- 
tunity to present his case."). 
165. 62 N.Y.2d 548, 468 N.E.2d 1, 479 N.Y.S.2d 163 (1984). ccrr. d ~ ~ ~ i ~ d ,  I05 S. Ct. 
1177 (1985). 
166. Id. at 557, 468 N.E.2d at 6, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 168 (Court of Appeals held that the 
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It is difficult to reconcile the court's decisions denying preclusive effect 
to issue determinations made at hearings when either the stakes were 
minimal or the procedures overly informal, and its decisions granting 
preclusive effect to administrative and arbitral  determination^.'^^ In Gil- 
berg v. Barbieri, for example, there was more at stake and Barbieri had as 
much reason to litigate in the City Court as Brugman, Clemens or Ryan 
did to litigate in their respective administrative and arbitral forums.'68 
In addition, Barbieri had greater procedural benefits than Ryan, 
Brugman, or C l e m e n ~ . ' ~ ~  Neither Brugman nor Clemens had any ad- 
versarial hearing before binding issue determinations were made against 
them by non-lawyers.170 Although Ryan had a hearing, he was not rep- 
resented by an attorney nor did he benefit from pretrial discovery or 
technical rules of evidence.l7I 
Most people seek administrative and arbitral relief without contem- 
plating legal action or the preclusive impact that a nonjudicial issue de- 
termination will have on their right to litigate a claim in a court of 
law.'72 In cases such as Koch v. Consolidated Edison Co., 173 where the 
court found the subsequent action f~reseeable,"~ the parties were sophis- 
ticated litigants with access to expert counsel, and, thus, could foresee 
that the earlier issue determination could act as a bar in a subsequent 
proceeding. Administrative forums are intended as places where parties 
full and fair opportunity requirement was satisfied because the defendant "recognizing 
the potential preclusive effects of an adverse determination in that case, had every incen- 
tive to defend that action fully and vigorously."). 
167. See The Record, supra note 24, at 746. 
168. Barbieri, charged with harassment, see N.Y. Penal Law $ 240.25(5) (McKinney 
1985) (harassment is a violation), and if convicted faced a possible fifteen day jail sen- 
tence. See N.Y. Penal Law $ 70.15(4) (h4cKinney 1975). In contrast, Clemens sought 
approximately $1,700 in medical fees. See Clemens v. Apple, 102 A.D.2d 236, 237, 477 
N.Y.S.2d 774, 776 (3d Dep't 1984), aff'd, 65 N.Y.2d 746,481 N.E.2d 560, 492 N.Y.S.2d 
20 (1985). Brugman sought partial disability, see Record on Appeal at 50-51, 56, 
Brugman v. City of New York, 64 N.Y.2d 1011, 478 N.E.2d 195, 489 N.Y.S.2d 54 
(1985). The benefits sought by Ryan were minimal. See supra notes 93-102 and accompa- 
nying text; see also The Record, supra note 24, at 746 (Barbieri faced a fifteen day jail 
sentence if convicted of harassment, while the average unemployment award, such as that 
sought by Ryan, is roughly $1500). 
169. Barbieri had the right to a court appointed attorney if he had been unable to 
afford one, see generally W.R. LaFave & J.H. Israel, Criminal Procedure 8 6.4 (1985) 
(criminal defendants have right to counsel); findings of fact must have been established 
beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. at 5 1.4(n). 
170. Seegenerally Clemens v. Apple, 65 N.Y.2d 746,481 N.E.2d 560,492 N.Y.S.2d 20 
(1985); Brugman v. City of New York, 64 N.Y.2d 1011, 478 N.E.2d 195, 489 N.Y.S.2d 
54 (1985). 
171. See supra notes 93-102 and accompanying text. 
172. See The Record, supra note 24, at 743 ("It is unlikely that most claimants, even 
those who may ultimately bring a charge or suit relating to their discharges, know at the 
time they file for unemployment benefits that there will be future litigation or that the 
doctrine of collateral estoppel may impinge on such later proceeding."). 
173. Koch v. Consolidated Edison Co., 62 N.Y.2d 548, 468 N.E.2d 1, 479 N.Y.S.2d 
163 (1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1177 (1985). 
174. Id. at 557, 468 N.E.2d at 6, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 168. 
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can have their claims processed without hiring a lawyer or incurring 
other expenses.175 Custom suggests that lay representation is more suc- 
cessll than representation by an attorney in administrative and arbitral 
f 0 r ~ r n s . l ~ ~  It is likely that indigent litigants in administrative and arbi- 
tral forums will favor lay representation that may be insensitive to the 
effect of issue determinations on subsequent litigation. Thus, courts 
should be wary of granting such determinations preclusive effect. If not, 
parties may be forced, in effect, to forego small claims because they can- 
not afford legal counsel to litigate administrative issues, that may later be 
decisive in unanticipated lawsuits. 
Although disputed factual issues may arise from the same transaction 
or occurrence, it is important to recognize that they may be developed 
differently in a judicial forum than in an administrative or arbitral hear- 
ing. Pre-trial discovery, evidentiary objections at trial, artful cross-exam- 
ination, and a skillful summation before a jury may logically lead to a 
decision in a court of law that is justifiably inconsistent with a decision 
made by an administrative hearing officer or a panel of arbitrators. Thus, 
general policy notions of inconsistency, which courts have not hesitated 
to disregard in interforum matters, are of little importance when deciding 
if an administrative or arbitral determination should be conclusive in a 
judicial forum. 
C. Finality and the Conservation of Resources 
In Ryan v. New York Telephone Co. ,I7* the Court of Appeals primarily 
relied on the concept of finality to justify its holding that an administra- 
175. 0. Chase, supra note 17, at 5 31.01 (1986). See generally Gellhorn 6c Benjamin, 
Administrative Adjudication in the State of New York 326-68 (1942) (administrative ac- 
tion may be pursued without an attorney); Note, Rabbinical Courts Modern Day Solo- 
mom, 6 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 49, 69 (1970) (alternative resources provide 
inexpensive forums for dispute resolution). 
176. Report by the New York Assembly Standing Committee on Labor (Fmk J. 
Barbaro, Chairman), Due Process in tile Unemploymenl Insurance System in hre)v York 
State, 7 (1981) (available in the files of Fordham Law Review (citing 1979 study con- 
ducted by National Commission on Unemployment Compensation which indicates how 
infrequently parties in fact obtain counsel); see also N.Y. Comp. Codes R. 6: Reg. tit. 12 
S462 .q~)  (statutory restrictions on payment of attorney fees). 
177. This observation is qualified when issue preclusion is given to the determination 
of one agency to preclude relitigation of a decisive issue before another agency which has 
similar procedural rules. See Mallia v. Webb, 103 A.D.2d 559, 563, 481 N.Y.S.2d 805, 
808 (3d Dep't 1984) (earlier determination, on application for aid to dependent children 
benefits, was entitled to preclusive effect in determining subsequent eligibility for foad 
stamps). On the other hand, when administrative forums have substantially different pro- 
cedural rules, the doctrine has not been applied. See, eg..  hlanhasset Bd. of Educ. v. 
N.Y.S. Human Rights, 106 A.D.2d 364, 366, 482 N.Y.S.2d 495, 497 (2d Dep't 1984) 
(preclusive effect not given to prior administration because complainants' allegation that 
she had been subjected to a racial slur was only briefly explored there.); see also Willer v. 
New York State Bd. of Regents, 101 A.D.2d 937, 937, 475 N.Y.S.2d 656, 657 (3d Dep't 
1984) (preclusive effect not given because prior administrative hearing did not give peti- 
tioner full and fair opportunity to litigate his claim). 
178. 62 N.Y.2d 494, 467 N.E.2d 487, 478 N.Y.S.2d 823 (1984). 
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tive issue determination precluded relitigation of the same decisive issue 
in a judicial forum.'79 The court found support for granting preclusive 
effect to an administrative determinati~n"~ in Evans v. Monaghan I s '  and 
In re V e n e ~ . ' ~ ~  In these decisions, the court emphasized that finality was 
the fundamental justification for claim preclusion in an admininstrative 
context, stating that "[s]ecurity of person and property requires that de- 
terminations in the field of administrative law should be given as much 
finality as is reasonably possible."183 Neither case, however, involved the 
question of whether an administrative finding on which its determination 
rested, should preclude litigation of the same decisive issue in a judicial 
forum. Thus, the Ryan court, in citing these cases as support for apply- 
ing issue preclusion relied on dicta. Issues do not have independent sig- 
nificance in the sense that claims do.Is4 Issue preclusion differs from 
claim preclusion in that it merely prohibits, in the interest of fairness,lgS 
the subsequent litigation of some, but not necessarily all, prior adjudi- 
cated i~sues."~ 
It is crucial to note that the principle of finality and the related need to 
conserve judicial resources evolved as justifications for issue preclusion in 
the context of judicial pr~ceedings.''~ Administrative and arbitral fo- 
rums resolve disputed issues with less stringent procedural safeguards 
than judicial proceedings which include pre-trial discovery, lengthy evi- 
dentiary hearings and technical rules of evidence.'" Justice in adminis- 
179. Id. at 499-500, 467 N.E.2d at 490, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 826 (" 'Justice requires that 
every cause be once fairly and impartially tried; but the public tranquillity demands that, 
having been once so tried, all litigation of that question, and between those parties, should 
be closed forever.' ") (quoting Fish v. Vanderlip, 218 N.Y. 29, 36-37, 112 N.E. 425, 427- 
28 (1916) (quoting Greenleaf, Evidence, $5 522-23)). 
180. See Ryan v. New York Tel. Co., 62 N.Y.2d 494,499,467 N.E.2d 487,489-90,478 
N.Y.2d 823, 825-26 (1984). 
181. 306 N.Y. 312, 118 N.E.2d 452 (1954). 
182. 43 N.Y.2d 520, 373 N.E.2d 987, 402 N.Y.S.2d 807 (1978). 
183. Id. at 524,373 N.E.2d at 989,402 N.Y.S.2d at 809 (quoting Evans v. Monaghan, 
306 N.Y. 312, 323-24, 118 N.E.2d 452, 457-58 (1954)). 
184. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text. 
185. The primary policy justification for issue preclusion has traditionally rested on 
society's belief that it is unfair for courts to permit a party who has unsuccessfully as- 
serted one position in a particular matter to relitigate that assertion (or a consistent asscr- 
tion) in a later proceeding based upon the same facts. See supra notes 13-16 and 
accompanying text; see also Ryan v. New York Tel. Co., 62 N.Y.2d 494, 500,467 N.E.2d 
487, 490, 478 N.Y.S.2d 823, 826 (1984) ("The doctrine of collateral estoppel [issue pre- 
clusion], a narrower species of res judicata, precludes a party from relitigating in a subse- 
quent action or proceeding an issue clearly raised in a prior action or proceeding. . . ."). 
186. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text. 
187. See Venes v. Community School Bd., 43 N.Y.2d 520, 523, 373 N.E.2d 987, 988, 
402 N.Y.S.2d 807, 808-09 (1978) ("Res judicata is a doctrine associated with dispute- 
resolution. . . . Its application to administrative proceedings is remarkably elusive, for i t  
has in large part been developed not in decisions applying res judicata to administrative 
adjudications, but rather by courts which . . . found the doctrine inapplicable to the cases 
before them."). 
188. See Sinha v. Ambach, 91 A.D.2d 703, 457 N.Y.S.2d 603 (3d Dep't 1982) ("Due 
process considerations do not require the full panoply of procedural tools uvuilable to 
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trative and arbritral forums has traditionally been viewed in terms of 
permitting citizens access to a simplified and informal dispute system 
that expeditiously resolves ~onflicts.''~ The procedural safeguards are 
often inimical to acheiving administrative and arbitral justice. The ab- 
sence of these procedures, however, increases the possibility "that grave 
errors may go unc~rrected." '~~ Thus, reliance on finality as a primary 
policy justification for the application of issue preclusion to administra- 
tive and arbitral determinations is misplaced. Although the notion that 
some administrative decisions should be considered final in order to re- 
lieve the judicial system of adjudicating certain disputes is reasonable, it 
should not apply when a different result is possible because the second 
forum affords a party procedural opportunities unavailable in the first.l9' 
- - 
The aim of conserving judicial resources is furthered by both accord- 
ing finality to subordinate court decisions and reducing incentives to ap 
peal.192 Granting preclusive effect to arbitral and administrative 
determinations, however, may compel a party to appeal in anticipation of 
subsequent litigation in which the issue determined will assume greater 
importance.193 The Court of Appeals has given little guidance for deter- 
mining when decisions of administrative agencies and arbitral tribunals 
will have preclusive consequences in other actions. 194 Thus, litigants, 
will be compelled to dedicate resources to contest simple matters for fear 
that issues decided against them will be given estoppel effect in n subse- 
quent lawsuit. Parties appearing before administrative and arbitral bod- 
ies will make increased discovery demands. There will be a reluctance by 
many parties to arbitrate unless there is a stipulation limiting the preclu- 
sive effect of the award. Although caseloads may be reuced, the practical 
effect is that dispute resolution resources will not be conserved. Rather, 
they will be re-allocated to administrative and arbitral forums. Treating 
civil litigants in an administrative proceeding."); Heim v. Regan, 90 A.D.2d 656. 657, 
456 N.Y.S.2d 257,258 (3d Dep't 1982) (not necessary to apply discovery rules. as embod- 
ied in CPLR article 31 to administrative hearings). 
189. See Goldstein, supra note 25, at 69-70 (congestion of courts and complexity of 
civil litigation support development of alternative forums); 3 J. Weinstein, H. Korn B A. 
Miller, New York Civil Practice 9 3031.01 (1986) (imperfection of judicial process may 
be resolved through creation of alternative forums); 3 A! Y. Judicial Conference Report 
94-97 (1958) (the imperfections of the judicial system most frequently noted as reasons 
for the movement away from the courts are: (1) crowded calendars and attendant delay; 
(2) limitations on the scope of permissible evidence bemuse of the exclusionary rules 
applied by the courts, (3) protracted trials; (4) unwanted publicity; harnssment of wit- 
nesses during cross-examination; (5) lack of confidence in the ability of judges to deter- 
mine disputes; and (6) high cost of counsel fees resulting from the length of the litigation 
process). 
190. 3 J. Weinstein, H. Korn & A. Miller, supra note 189, 3031.01. 
191. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore. 439 U.S. 322, 330-31 (1979) ("Still another situa- 
tion where it might be unfair to apply offensive estoppel is where the second action af- 
fords the defendant procedural opportunities unavailable in the first action that could 
readily cause a different result."). 
192. Hazard, supra note 9, at 91 (1984). 
193. Id. 
194. See The Record, supra note 24, at 744-48. 
Heinonline - -  55 Fordham L. Rev. 93 1986-1987 
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW 
administrative and arbitral determinations as final for purposes of issue 
preclusion may ultimately conflict with the need to conserve resources. 
In addition, when courts make these issue determinations decisive in an 
administrative or arbitral forum, they surrender their authority to a hid- 
den judiciary.lg5 An independent judiciary may be compromised when its 
authority is diffused and re-allocated under the banner of conserving re- 
sources and reducing caseloads. 
IV. WHEN AN ADMINISTRATIVE OR ARBITRAL ISSUE 
DETERMINATION SHOULD PRECLUDE REL~TIGATION OF 
THE SAME DECISIVE ISSUE IN A JUDICIAL 
FORUM 
Government services in New York are provided by 56 federal agencies, 
133 state departments and agencies, 62 counties, 62 districts, 5383 special 
districts, 2202 public authorities, 122 urban renewal agencies, and 104 
industrial development agencies.lg6 Most of these agencies have special- 
ized functions and make regulatory and adjudicative determinationslg7 
that are regulated by the New York State Administrative Procedures 
AC~("A.P.A.").'~* Thus, if the purpose of our judicial system is to re- 
195. See Ciemens v. Apple, 65 N.Y.2d 746,481 N.E.2d 560, 492 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1985) 
(arbitral issue determination given effect by court of law); Brugman v. City of New York, 
64 N.Y.2d 1011, 478 N.E.2d 195, 489 N.Y.S.2d 54 (1985) (administrative issue determi- 
nation given effect by court of law). 
196. New York State Bar Association, New York State Regulatory Reform (Report of 
Action Unit No. 5), 54 (1982). 
197. Id. at 37. 
198. N. Y. A.P.A., (McKinney 1976 amended 1984). This is a uniform code of admin- 
istrative adjudications by state agencies. Under A.P.A. an "adjudicatory proceeding" 
generally means "any activity which is not a rule making proceeding or an employee 
disciplinary action." N.Y. A.P.A. $ 102(3) (McKinney 1984). Although Article 111 of 
A.P.A. spells out in detail the elements of an adjudicatory proceeding, it is still frequently 
difficult to differentiate between rule-making determinations and adjudicative determina- 
tions. Adjudicative proceedings are those in which a determination of the legal rights, 
duties or privileges of named parties thereto is required by law to be made orily on a 
record and after an opportunity for a hearing. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Judg- 
ments 4 83, Comment (b) (1982); Abramson, supra note 149, at 1096-98 (1983); Maines, 
Offensive Collateral Estoppel in Mass Tort or Products Liability Cases: The Potential for 
Corporate Catastrophe from Prior Administrative Proceedings, 5 Admin. L. Rev. 327, 345 
(1983). It is generally clear that adjudicatory action involves the resolution of disputed 
issues of past conduct while legislative agency action involves the fashioning of prospec- 
tive rules to govern future conduct. See Maines, supra, at 345 (citing K. Davis, 2 Admin- 
istrative L. Treatise, $ 18.08, at 597 (1958)). 
Article I11 of A.P.A. is entitled "Adjudicatory Proceedings." Its provisions, which 
relate to (1) hearings, (2) the record, (3) presiding officer, (4) powers of presiding officers, 
(5) disclosure, (6) evidence and (7) decisions, determinations and orders, are made appli- 
cable to "any department, board, bureau, commission, division, office, council, committee 
or officer of the state, or a public benefit corporation or public authority. . . authorized by 
law to make . . . final decisions in adjudicatory proceedings . . ." N.Y. A.P.A. 4 102(1) 
(McKinney 1984). Article I11 is not applicable to "agencies in the legislative and judicial 
branches, agencies created by interstate compact. . ., the state insurance fund, the unem- 
ployment insurance appeal board and the workers' compensation board . . ." Id. Nor 
does it apply to "an administrative tribunal created by statute to hear or determine allegn- 
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solve disputes, and if principles of issue preclusion further this goal by 
preventing the relitigation of issue  determination^,'^^ it is consistent with 
the purposes of the doctrine to apply it, when appropriate, to administra- 
tive rulings in order to relieve courts of the burden of resolving certain 
disputes.200 If every administrative dispute could be re-litigated in court, 
many agency proceedings would be unnecessarily dupli~ated.'~' These 
concerns also apply to arbitration awards, which resolve many disputes 
tions of traffic infractions . . ." See id. 102(3). New York State agencies subject to 
A.P.A. are required to "adopt rules governing the procedures on adjudicatory proceed- 
ings and appeals. . . [and to] prepare a summary of such proceeding in plain language," 
id. 5 301(3), which shall be made available to the public on request. See id. Thesc agency 
"adjudicatory procedures" provide that all parties be given an opportunity for a hearing 
within reasonable time. See N.Y. A.P.A. 301(1) WcKinney 1984). Reasonable notice 
of the hearing includes: 
(a) a statement of the time, place, and nature of the hearing; (b) a statement of 
the legal authority and jurisdiction under which the hearing is to be held; (c) a 
reference to the particular sections of the statutes and rules involved, tvhere 
possible; (d) a short and plain statement of matters asserted. 
Id. 301(2). These procedures afford all parties participating in the hearing an "opportu- 
nity to present written argument on issues of law and an opportunity to present evidence" 
before an impartial hearing officer. Id. 301(4). The officer can "[aJdminister oaths and 
affirmations," Id. 304(1), "[s]ign and issue subpoenas in the name of the agency," id. 
$ 304(2), "blrovide for the taking of testimony by deposition," id. 6 304(3). "(rJegulate 
the course of the hearings. "id. !j 304(4), and actively promote "simplification of the issues 
by consent of the parties." Id. 304(5). Agencies may, but are not specifically required 
to, "adopt rules providing for discovery and depositions." Id. § 305. All evidence on 
which the agency will rely including records and documents in its possession arc usually 
offered and made a part of the record. Id. 306(2). This record must be a "complete 
record" of the entire proceeding. Id. 302(2). It is similar, in many respects, to records 
made at the trial level in the court system and includes "findings of fact" which are based 
exclusively on the evidence presented to the hearing officer. Unless othenvise provided 
by any statute, agencies need not observe the formal rules of evidence applicable in the 
courts and may, when appropriate, permit submission of all or part of thc evidence in 
written form. See id. 306(4). Parties have the right of crosssxamination, but the hear- 
ing officer has discretion to exclude irrelevant or "unduly repetitious evidence or cross- 
examination may be excluded." Id § 306(1). "p]he burden of proof [is generally] upon 
the party who initiated the proceeding." Id 306(1). For a discussion of the contro- 
versy over the adoption of A.P.A. see Gifford, The New York Srare Adminkrrarive Pme- 
dure Act: Some Rejktiotts Upon Its Structure and Legfirire Hkrory, 26 Buffalo L. Rev. 
589 (197T). 
. ,
199. See supra notes 2-7 and accompanying text. 
200. This is particularly true in New York, where over twenty percent of the nation's 
lawsuits are filed and where the annual number of cases disposed of by the state's courts 
is ten times the number of cases disposed of each year by the entire fedenl judiciary. See 
Remarks by Honorable Sol Wachler, Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals, before Annual 
Dinner of the New York State Bar Association, January 17, 1986 (available in the files of 
Fordham Law Review). 
201. See Evans v. Monaghan, 306 N.Y. 312,323, 118 N.E.2d 452,457 (1954) ("deter- 
minations in the field of administrative law should be given as much finality as is reason- 
ably possible."); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 83 comment b (1982) ("the social 
importance of stability in the results of [administrative and arbitnl] decisions corre- 
sponds to the importance of stability in judicial judgments"). Bur see SCM Corp. v. 
Fisher Park Lane Co., 40 N.Y.2d 788, 793, 358 N.E.2d 1024, 1028, 390 N.Y.S.2d 398, 
403 (1976) (arbitral awards should not have the precedential value of judicial 
determinations). 
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that would otherwise burden the courts.202 
Litigants in administrative and arbitral proceedings are free to hire 
counsel and in some instances benefit from adjudicatory rules of discov- 
ery and evidence that are similar to those available in courts of law.203 
Ideally, justice in these forums is fairly and efficiently administered by 
experts in the relevant area of law.'" In addition, judicial review of ad- 
ministrative determinations of arbitral awards is available under New 
York law.205 Thus, if an administrative or arbitral issue determination is 
quasi-judicial in naturezo6 and if it is subject to judicial appellate review, 
202. D. Siegel, supra note 2, $456 (1978) ("Any other conclusion would undermine 
the important and expanding arbitration process . . . ") (footnote omitted). 
203. See supra note 195 and accompanying text. See generally Schwartz, Administra- 
tive Law, 30 Syracuse L. Rev. 1, 7 (1979). The minimal procedural standards are set 
forth in N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. $ 7506 (McKinney 1980). These are, basically, that the 
arbitrator be sworn to decide the disputed issues fairly, see id. $ 7506(a) and that each 
party have notice, see id. an opportunity to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses, 
see id. at $ 7506@), and be represented by an attorney. See id. at $ 7506(d); see also SCM 
Corp. v. Fisher Park Lane Co., 40 N.Y.2d 788, 792-793, 358 N.E.2d 1024, 1028, 390 
N.Y.S.2d 398, 402 (1976) (discussing procedures at arbitration). 
204. See Siegel v. Lewis, 40 N.Y.2d 687, 689-90, 358 N.E.2d 484, 485-86, 389 
N.Y.S.2d 800, 802 (1976) (arbitrator's expertise may be desireable to one of parties); 
Palmer, The Evolving Role of Administrative Law Judges, 19 New Eng. L. Rev. 755, 755 
(1983-84) (administrative judiciary should be composed of experts). 
205. See N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. $5 7511, 7803 (McKinney 1980). To be final, an 
administrative determination must not be subject to appellate review by the agency or to 
judicial review under article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Laws and Rules. See 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments, $ 83 comment a, $ 84, 8 J. Weinstein, H. Korn & A. 
Miller, supra note 96, at $$ 75.01, 78.01, 78.04 (g). See generally D. Siegel, supra note 
123, at 1 (discussing application of issue preclusion to administrative and arbitral 
determinations). 
206. Ryan v. New York Tel. Co., 62 N.Y.2d 494, 499, 467 N.E.2d 487, 489, 478 
N.Y.S.2d 823, 825 (1984) ("At the outset, it should be made clear that the doctrines of res 
judicata [claim prediusio'nj and collateral estoppel [issue preclusion] are applicable to give 
conclusive effect to the quasi-judicial determinations of administrative agencies.") (cita- 
tions omitted). Thus, i f the issue is determined at a tribunal which has the power to 
conduct a hearing and decide an issue, see 8 J. Weinstein, H. Korn & A. Miller, supra 
note 96, $ 7803.11 (factors used when classifying action as administrative or quasi-judi- 
cial), whether it is a board, commission, agency or other body, it is "entitled to the same 
treatment that a duly rendered judicial judgment gets." D. Siegel, supra note 2, $ 456, at 
603 (1978). In such instances, issue preclusion will be permitted if not incompatible with 
legislative policy. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments $5 83(4), 84(3) (1982). Other 
general limitations are suggested by the Restatement (Second). See id. $5 83 comment h, 
84 comment f. 
Courts often have difficulty in defining the term quasi-judicial, usually viewing i t  in 
terms of the nature of the precise power being exercised by the administrative agency. 
See, e.g., Venes v. Community School Bd., 43 N.Y.2d 520, 524-25, 373 N.E.2d 987, 989, 
402 N.Y.S.2d 807, 809 (1978) (issue preclusion not applied to determination by school 
board because it was not, in terms of the precise power being exercised, a quasi-judicial 
decision); Evans v. Monaghan, 306 N.Y. 312, 324, 118 N.E.2d 452,457-58 (1954) ("Such 
departures from the rule as there may be in administrative law appear to spring from the 
peculiar necessities of the particular case or the nature of the precise power being exer- 
cised, rather than from any general distinction between courts and administrative tribu- 
nals."); Turner Constr. Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 57 A.D.2d 201, 204, 394 N.Y.S.2d 78, 
81 (3d Dep't 1977) (Tax commission determination would not be given preclusive effect 
in later judicial action because it was ministerial in light of the " 'necessities of the partic- 
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it is reasonable to preclude relitigation of the same decisive issue in n 
judicial forum. However, if the peculiar necessities of a case and the na- 
ture of the precise administrative or arbitral power involved indicate that 
a decision was not made in a quasi-judicial, adversarial setting with a full 
and fair hearing, then the doctrine should not be applied in subsequent 
judicial action.207 
It should be recognized that the typical justifications for giving preclu- 
sive effect to administrative and arbitral determinations should have lim- 
ited application in judicial proceedings.*08 "The vagaries of the 
administrative process"209 under The New York State Administrative 
Procedures Act ("APA") and the informality of arbitration proceedings 
argue against the Court of Appeals' decision that administrative and ar- 
bitral determinations should be given preclusive effect in judicial pro- 
ceed ing~ .~ '~  Rather, before applying the doctrine of issue preclusion to 
administrative and arbitral determinations, courts should permit the 
party seeking to avoid preclusion to show factors which can raise a rebut- 
table presumption that the non-judicial determination be denied preclu- 
sive effect.'ll Although a decision to grant issue preclusion needs to be 
decided on the specific circumstances of each case, such factors should 
include, inter alia: (1) the existence of admissible evidence, unavailable at 
the previous hearing (because, for example, full disclosure was not avail- 
able, tending to support the position of the party defending against pre- 
clusion); (2) a showing that the party defending against preclusion was 
denied the opportunity to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses, 
or that the effectiveness of such presentation and cross-examination was 
ular case or the nature of the precise power being exercised' ") (quoting Evans. 306 N.Y. 
at 324, 118 N.E.2d at 457-58). 
207. See Venes v. Community School Bd., 43 N.Y.2d 520, 524, 373 N.EZd 987,989, 
402 N.Y.S.2d 807, 809 (1978) ("the doctrine should be applied to some administrative 
proceedings, modiied for some, and rejected for others") (quoting K. Davis, Adminis- 
trative L. Treatise 5 18.10, at 371 (3d ed. 1972)). In Venes, the court also directed that 
"blefore applying the doctrine of res judicata to an administrative determination, it is 
necessary to determine whether to do so would be consistent with the function of the 
administrative agency involved . . . ," id., 373 N.E.2d at 989, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 809, and 
that the doctrine "is to be applied to an agency determination only if such application is 
consistent with the nature of the particular administrative adjudication." Id.. 373 N.E2d 
at 989, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 809. 
208. See supra Part 111. 
209. Cf: Perschbacher, supra note 138, at 459 (discussing federal administrative 
proceedings). 
210. See supra Part 111, notes 147-48 and accompanying text. CJ Perschbacher. supra 
note 138, at 459 (discussing the federal court system). 
21 1. Cf: Perschbacher, supra note 138, at 459 (discussing the federal court system). 
This is contrary to the approach taken by the Restatement (Second) of Judgments (1982) 
$ 83(1) that is based on the assumption that "proof-taking in an administrative or arbitra- 
tion tribunal may be relatively informal but may nevertheless permit the parties to pres- 
ent substantially the same evidence that might be adduced through the more formal 
procedures characteristic of courts." Id., $5 83-87 introductory note at 265. This as- 
sumption lacks merit because judges can seldom verify the impact of evidence that tvas 
not admitted or considered. 
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severely limited by the presiding officer at the non-judicial forum or be- 
cause the evidence was inadmissible under the rules of that forum; and 
(3) a showing that the party was not represented by an attorney in the 
previous action. When this presumption is raised on the ground of the 
existence of new evidence, the party seeking to invoke preclusion may 
rebut by showing that the sum of the evidence, viewed in the light most 
favorable to the party defending against preclusion, could not support an 
alternate finding. Similarly, when the presumption is raised on the 
ground of a denial of the opportunity to present evidence and cross-ex- 
amine witnesses or the severe limitation of this opportunity, the party 
seeking to invoke preclusion must demonstrate that such opportunity 
would not have resulted in a different determination. Finally, when the 
party defending against preclusion has raised this presumption by show- 
ing that he was not represented by an attorney, the party seeking preclu- 
sion may successfully rebut it by demonstrating either (a) that the 
defending party was fully aware of the possible preclusive effect of the 
earlier determination (such as by showing that the judicial action was 
commenced prior to the one in the non-judicial forum) and that the party 
was afforded an opportunity to present evidence and cross-examine wit- 
nesses; or (b) that the party had both the opportunity to present evidence 
and cross-examine witnesses and that the evidence on which the non- 
judicial determination was based was sufficiently reliable to be admitted 
in a judicial action. 
The application of issue preclusion should not circumvent the legisla- 
tive intent of APA which mandates expeditious administrative proceed- 
i n g ~ . ~ ~ ~  Issue preclusion should neither interfere with the equitable 
administration of laws213 nor conflict with legislative policy that determi- 
nations of non-judicial bodies should not be accorded conclusive effect in 
subsequent court  proceeding^.^'^ 
It does not perforce that denying preclusive effect to arbitral and ad- 
ministrative decisions will render these determinations meaningless. Ad- 
ministrative and arbitral findings would be admissible as evidence in 
subsequent court proceedings subject to the usual rules of 
212. See N.Y. A.P.A. 5 100 (McKinney 1984) (the purpose of the Act is to provide 
people with simple uniform procedures). 
213. Restatement (Second) of Judgments 9 83(3)(4) (1982); The Record, supra note 24, 
at 739 ("The Purpose and Nature of Unemployment Insurance Proceedings"). 
214. Restatement (Second) of Judgments 9 83(4)(a) (1982). 
215. A similar approach is followed in federal Title VII litigation. See Perschbachcr, 
supra note 138 at 461 nn.182-83. Determinations of the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission are admissible as evidence. Id. In addition, administrative agencies usually 
admit the record and findings of fact in earlier related proceedings as evidence at subse- 
quent hearings. See N.Y. A.P.A. 5 306(2) (McKinney 1984) (all evidence in possession 
of agency may be made part of record). The New York courts should adopt a related 
process. Thus any adverse statement made by a witness under oath at an administrative 
or arbitration hearing can be used to impeach his credibility in a court of law. See 5 J. 
Weinstein, H. Korn & A. Miller, supra note 2, at 5 4514 (1985) (impeachment of witness 
by prior inconsistent statement). 
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This approach would permit many findings of fact to be used for im- 
peachment purposes without encouraging courts to extend the doctrine 
of issue preclusion by what Professor Currie refers to as the "logical 
processes of manipulati~n."~'~ 
Finally, the legislature should enact rules that limit the preclusive ef- 
fect of some findings of fact or law made by administrative agencies and 
arbitral trib~nals.~" Indeed, issue preclusion does not apply to decisions 
in minor cases such as small claims actions218 because as the Court of 
Appeals has pointed out, "[tlhe brisk, often informal way in which these 
matters must be tried, as well as the relative insignificance of the out- 
come, afford the party neither opportunity nor incentive to litigate thor- 
oughly or as thoroughly as he might if more were at Thus, 
because preclusive effect cannot be applied to informal judicial proceed- 
ings, the same logic should be true for most administrative and arbitra- 
tion hearings. 
CONCLUSION 
There is great emphasis today on the development of alternative dis- 
pute resolutions such as arbitration and administrative adjudication.*O 
These procedures provide our citizens with efficient and inexpensive ac- 
cess to justice. Our society also has a strong but not unequivocal interest 
in seeing that things judicially decided stay decided. While the doctrines 
of claim preclusion and issue preclusion have been used to achieve this 
goal, the Court of Appeals has required that their application to judicial 
determinations be balanced with fundamental notions of fairness.=' 
Denying issue preclusion to administrative and arbitral determinations 
216. Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Esloppel: Limits of tile Bernhard Doctrine. 9 Stan. 
L. Rev. 281, 289 (1957). 
217. See The Record, supra note 24, at 748-49 (1985). A similar result is suggested by 
Professor Abramson, who urges that A.P.A. be amended to assure informed decision 
making. See Abramson, supra note 144, at 1096-98 (1983). 
218. See N.Y. City Civ. Ct. Act 9 1808 (McKinney 1963 6; Supp. 1986) ("A judgment 
obtained under this article may be pleaded as res judicata only as to the amount involved 
in the particular action and shall not othenvise be deemed an adjudication of any fact at 
issue or found therein in any other action or court."); Koch v. Consolidated Edison Co., 
62 N.Y.2d 548, 556, 468 N.E.2d 1, 5, 479 N.Y.S.2d 163, 167, (1984), cerr. denied, 105 
S.Ct. 1177 (1985) (court refuses to give res judicata effect to smdl claim determination 
(citing City Civ. Ct. Act 5 1804, 1808)). 
219. Gilberg v. Barbieri, 53 N.Y.2d 285, 293, 423 N.E.2d 807, 810, 441 N.Y.S.2d 49, 
52, (1981). 
220. See The APA supra note 25, at 355-58; Breger supra note 25, at 951-55; Green, 
Marks & Olsen, supra note 25, at 501. See generally Keller, ,Wini-trial Procedures of the 
American Arbitration Association, Arbitration Times Winter 1986, 5; Burger, Chief Jus- 
tice Supports Arbitration, Arbitration Times, Fa11 1985, 1; Metaxas, Alternafiw to Lifiga- 
tion are Maturing, 8 Nat'l. L. J., May 12, 1986, at 1; Judges End Cases Faster Using Tnbl 
Alternatives, New York Times, Friday January 3, 1986, A-8; Business and file Lon*: The 
Big Debate Over Litigation, N.Y. Times, Tuesday, May 13, 1986, at D-2; Neigfrborhood 
Justice of Chicage - The Success and tire Ciralletlge, 18 Dispute Resolution (American Bar 
Association Special Committee on Dispute Resolution) 1, 16 (Spring 1986). 
221. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
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will not overwhelm our courts. The judicial time saving that presumably 
results by application of the doctrine has been ove re~ t ima ted .~~~  It will, 
however, minimize the potential for unfairness. Administrative and arbi- 
tral procedures are substantially different from judicial procedure. By 
performing adjudicative and management functions, non-judicial person- 
nel serve functions other than the objective and impartial resolution of 
disputes. Judges can seldom verify whether these functions comport 
with the basic notions of due process that are essential to our judicial 
system.223 Hence, issue preclusion should be used only to give conclusive 
effect to administrative and arbitral forums in a court of law when the 
party seeking to invoke it has established that the full and fair opportu- 
nity requirement has been satisfied. 
222. See Metaxas, supra note 220, at D-2 (time saving contemplated by alternative 
dispute resolution less than anticipated); Motley, Why We are a Nation of Litigators, 6 U .  
Bridgeport L. Rev. 9, 17 (litigation tide which currently engulfs us is healthy and has its 
roots in American judicial system); Resnik, supra note 150, at 942, n.480 (numbers other 
than filing rates must be examined to account for increased litigation.) 
223. K. Davis, Administrative Law Text, 9 4.02 (3d ed. 1972) ("much informal action 
is not even theoretically reviewable and more than ninety-nine percent of what is review- 
able is not in fact reviewed"). 
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